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AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE (ASF) CIVILIAN STAFFING, TRAINING AND ROSTERING (STR) WORKSHOP

10th – 12th July 2008, Kampala, Uganda

WORKSHOP REPORT

Report of the African Standby Force Civilian Dimension Staffing, Training and Rostering Workshop

10 – 12 July 2008
Kampala, Uganda

Hosted by

The African Union, Peace Support Operations Division

In partnership with

The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes

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I. Executive Summary:

The African Union (AU) Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD), in partnership with the African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), embarked on a project to develop the Civilian Dimension of the African Standby Force (ASF) in 2006. The first phase was aimed at developing an official AU and ASF policy on the civilian dimension, and a Draft *Policy Framework for the Civilian Dimension of the ASF* was produced in September 2006. The Policy Framework clarified the policy context, the multi-dimensional management structure, the main civilian roles and responsibilities, the main police roles and responsibilities and the mission support functions that are needed to be in place to support the civilian and police dimensions of the ASF.

The Policy Framework was developed into an Implementation Plan in April 2007 that contained recommendations for the operationalization of the civilian dimension of the ASF in a number of key areas including: conduct and discipline, gender, HIV/AIDS, human resources, training, integrated missions planning, capacity building and awareness-raising.

The AU PSOD conducted an ASF Training Implementation Workshop in October 2007, to develop a training plan for the ASF. During the Workshop it was recognised that there was a need to focus ASF training more on civilian and police aspects.

During a planning meeting conducted in February 2008, it became apparent that, for civilian training issues to be meaningfully discussed there would also be a need to address the staffing, recruiting and rostering aspects of the civilian dimension of the ASF. Consequently, a *Civilian Staffing, Training and Rostering (STR) Workshop was convened in* Kampala in July 2008, to generate recommendations re the staffing, recruitment, rostering and training of the civilian dimension of the ASF. The Workshop was also aimed at harmonizing the

approach of the AU and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs) with regards to the civilian dimension of the ASF.

Working on the staffing of the civilian dimension of the ASF, the workshop developed a list of civilian functions that should be provided for in each regional ASF capacity. The Workshop recommended that each regional capacity should be able to deploy approximately sixty (60) civilians and develop a civilian standby roster of approximately three hundred (300) civilian specialists The Workshop also recommended that the deployment of the civilian dimension occur in waves, with the first wave reflecting the most important civilian elements without which a multi-dimensional mission should not deploy and building up in later waves until full civilian strength is reached. The Workshop further recommended that in order to manage the development of this civilian capacity the AU PSOD and each Regional Brigade Planning Elements (PLANELMs) should have four (4) civilian members, namely a training and rostering officer, a planning and coordination officer, a logistics officer, and a head for the civilian component of the PLANELM.

With regard to recruitment the Workshop considered the merits and demerits of direct hiring and secondments for those civilian positions in the ASF civilian standby rosters, as well as those in PLANELMs. It recommended that the existing AU and REC human resources and recruitment policies be augmented with policies that are specifically aimed at meeting the needs of the AU and RECs to deploy civilians on peace operations and related field missions. Such policies should provide for both direct hiring and secondments, as may be appropriate and should consider a range of contracting options to ensure the rapid deployment of certain categories of civilian staff, as well as continuity among civilian staff in the PLANELMs.

The Workshop also considered three models of civilian standby rosters. The first was a combination of an ASF Rapid Deployment Roster made up from existing

AU and REC staff augmented by an External Roster provided by an organization like AFDEM. The second model was an Integrated ASF and REC Roster and the third model was an ASF Stand Alone Roster. The recognised that models 1 and 2 would establish the most wide-ranging and inter-locking capacities, whilst model 3 would establish the most focused capacity. It recommended model 1, as it felt that it was probably the most pragmatic option as it provides for a limited internal Rapid Deployment Capacity at the level of the AU and RECs/RMs, as well as an outsourced medium to long-term standby roster capacity. It was strongly emphasized that whichever model was decided upon, it would need to be simple, manageable and easy to use and resource.

With regard to training the Workshop recommended that training for all civilian personnel of the ASF should be a mandatory requirement prior to deployment. It was recommended that the AU should, in cooperation with the RECs/RMs and training service providers, set the civilian training standards and develop an ASF training policy. It was stressed that civilian peacekeepers will be at times deployed in hostile and hazardous environments and need to be prepared for the related challenges. It was strongly recommended that the training methodology should, where appropriate, and in addition to a classroom component, include practical field and simulation training. Thus participation of civilians in Levels I, II and III Decision Making Exercises (MAPEX, CPX and FTX) would be important. There should also be an emphasis on problem-based learning which allows for participants to identify and discuss particular issues and come up with solutions. It was recommended that civilian training should consist of both integrated and single component training, and that the regional training centres of excellence and other civil society organizations that provide training for civilians should (through the APSTA framework) continue to cooperate closely not only amongst each other but also with the international civilian training partners.

On the whole, the Workshop provided a forum for the AU, RECs/RMs, Member States and civil society to consider and make recommendations re the staffing,

recruitment, rostering and training of the civilian dimension of the ASF. In addition to the recommendations summarised above, and discussed in more detail in the body of the report, the Workshop agreed on the following short- to medium-term follow-on actions:

o The AU PSOD and the Regional Brigade PLANELMs should work jointly on developing job descriptions for the approximately 60 civilian positions agreed upon;

o The AU and RECs/RMs should develop and harmonize their respective human resources policies for peace operations and field missions, including streamlined recruitment procedures that provide for the rapid recruitment of staff through a civilian standby roster capacity;

o An AUC/RECs/RMs task team should be established to design an ASF civilian standby roster based on the discussions of this Workshop;

o The AU and RECs/RMs, in cooperation with APSTA, should start the process of generating training standards for civilian ASF staff; and

o The Regional Brigades should start with the identification, recruitment and training of the approximately 300 civilians needed in each regional civilian standby roster, in order to be able to deploy approximately 60 civilians each. This process will be informed by the job descriptions, training standards and roster models discussed above, but can in the mean time start with the integration and involvement of civilians in ASF related training courses and exercises.

II. Background:

In 2006, the AU PSOD, in partnership with the ACCORD, embarked on a project to develop the Civilian Dimension of the African Standby Force (ASF). The first phase was aimed at developing an official AU and ASF policy on the civilian dimension, and a Draft Policy Framework for the Civilian Dimension of the ASF was discussed and produced at a *Technical Experts Workshop on the Civilian Dimension of the ASF* that took place from 28 August – 1 September 2006 at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Accra, Ghana. The Policy Framework clarified the policy context, the multi-dimensional management structure and decision-making process, the main civilian roles and responsibilities, the main police roles and responsibilities and the mission support functions that need to be in place to support the civilian and police dimensions.

At this stage the police component was still regarded as 'civilian' and the Policy Framework thus addressed the police dimension as well. Subsequently it was decided to manage the police component separately.

The next phase was aimed at developing an implementation plan for the Policy Framework. A *Technical Experts Task Team Meeting* that was held from 11 – 13 April 2007 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The Task Team produced an Implementation Plan that contained recommendations for the operationalization of the civilian dimension of the ASF in a number of key areas including: conduct and discipline, gender, HIV/AIDS, human resources, training, integrated missions policies, capacity building and awareness raising.

From 29 – 31 October 2007, the PSOD in collaboration with the African Peace Support Trainers' Association (APSTA) conducted a *Training Implementation Workshop* in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to finalize a Training Plan for the ASF by collating the training schedules of the ASF regional brigades into one continental training schedule leading up to 2010. As a result of this Workshop the PSOD

noticed that the regional brigade training plans were focused on the military aspects of training, and did not reflect the multidimensional nature of the ASF.

On 6 February 2008, the PSOD convened a planning meeting to prepare a workshop hat would further strengthen the civilian dimension of the ASF. The AU and RECs/RMs present recognised that in order for civilian training issues to be meaningfully discussed, the Workshop would also have to address the staffing and rostering aspects of the civilian dimension of the ASF, as recommended in the ASF Civilian Dimension Implementation Plan. The planning meeting thus decided to broaden the scope and organise a *Civilian Staffing, Training and Rostering (STR) Workshop*. The key objective of the Workshop would be to harmonize the approach of the AU and the RECs/RMs with regards to the civilian dimension of the ASF. Further, the Workshop would aim to devise a training plan for the civilian dimension including looking at a generic civilian structure and the issue of maintaining a roster of civilians for ASF deployments - thus the importance of approaching the four aspects - staffing, recruitment, rostering and training – in a complementary manner.

III. STR Workshop:

The Civilian STR Workshop was held from 10 – 12 July 2008 at the Speke Resort and Conference Centre in Kampala, Uganda. There were sixty-seven (67) participants representing the AU, RECs/RMs, AU Member States, APSTA, the United Nations (UN) Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), European Union (EU), non-governmental Organisations (both regional and international) and civil society organisations involved in civilian capacity building; research and academic institutions. Apart from civilian experts, the workshop included key military and police representatives from AU Member States and the Regional Brigade structures, so as to ensure that the workshop benefited from a multidimensional perspective. A full list of participants is attached as Annex 2.

1. Welcome and Opening of Workshop

The Workshop was opened by the head of the PSOD, Mr. Bereng Mtimkulu, who emphasised that whilst a considerable amount of preparation had gone into the planning for military structures and procedures for their deployment for instance, there still seemed to be an impression among some that the "civilians just arrive" on their own accord. He argued that the ASF process has not invested sufficient time and resources into exploring which civilian functions were required, the exact timing that they should be deployed, under which sorts of contracts and other related considerations. He also touched upon the growing realisation amongst especially military planners and Member States of the AU of the need to revise the tendency for the usage of overly militaristic terminology when referring to the ASF and a need rather to develop terminology that was more embracive of the multidimensional character of the ASF.

In addition, Mr. Mtimkulu reflected on the challenges that beset the AU missions in Burundi (AMIB), Sudan (AMIS) and Somalia (AMISOM) and the financial, institutional, physical and security challenges that had plagued these missions and had served to cast a shadow of doubt over the long term ability of the AU to manage multidimensional peacekeeping operations on the continent.

Mr Mtimkulu encouraged the Workshop to consider the following crucial questions during its three-day deliberations:

- the process and/or method for deploying civilians;

- considering the financial limitations facing the AU, the extent to which the organization could merge with UN standards and mirror its thinking on peacekeeping;

- suggestions as to what the non-military components of the force should look like; and

- the types of structures that should be provided at the regional, headquarters and mission levels taking into consideration the constraints and challenges faced.

Mr. Mtimkulu ended his welcome address by stating the importance of the ASF not becoming synonymous with "cheap peacekeeping" especially in light of its scheduled operationalization in 2010. He further stressed that a good deal of work still needed to be contributed to the effort so as to ensure a drastic change in the manner in which African peacekeeping was conducted. He thanked the Norwegian Government for the financial support it had rendered to the Project through the Training for Peace (TfP) in Africa Project which included the funding of the STR Workshop.

2. Workshop Goals and Objectives

In his overview of the aims and objectives, Mr. Cedric de Coning emphasized that the Workshop should have as its key focus, the civilian staff that would be required, how they would be recruited, the type of rostering system that would be employed and the type of training they would require both before and after deployment. Clear recommendations would be required to inform and guide the AU, RECs/RMs and the standby brigades and the planning elements on their work vis-à-vis planning, recruiting, rostering and training for the ASF. An underlying purpose of the Workshop would be that all stakeholders and partners have a common understanding of the civilian dimension which would in turn ensure interoperability and coherence in approach.

3. Overview of the ASF and Role of Civilian Dimension

In his presentation on the overview of the ASF, Mr. Mtimkulu pointed out that the ASF was composed of multi-disciplinary elements with civilian, police and military components, in their countries of origin, and ready for rapid deployment, at appropriate notice. He also noted that ASF missions should focus on observer and monitoring missions, intervention in a member state, post conflict

reconstruction, peacebuilding, humanitarian assistance, demobilisation, disintegration and rehabilitation (DDR), and preventive deployment. A particular challenge that was raised pertained to the deployment of an ASF mission within fourteen (14) days of a mandate of the Assembly, in countries where gross human rights activities were underway.

His overview highlighted the status of the various structures of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), which not only served to set the broad context within which the ASF was situated but also gave the Workshop group a better appreciation of the mutually supportive role of its components. He enumerated the components of APSA as the PSC – which is at the heart of the APSA, the Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP), the Military Staff Committee (MSC), the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the Panel of the Wise (POW), the ASF and the Peace Fund.

It was stressed that the ASF was not envisaged as Africa's contribution to world peace and not a replacement of the United Nation's (UN) work in so far as peace and security was concerned. Mr. Mtimkulu also gave a brush stroke summary of the work that had been done over the last three (3) years on the development of the ASF, namely that Africa went from having nothing in place to establishing a phased approach as indicated below, within which to develop the ASF:

> *Phase 1:* Establish the baseline documentation policy and tools for the ASF;
> *Phase 2:* Consolidate the policy documents, seek their approval, and develop the concepts of operations and a training plan; and
> *Phase 3:* Test the documents in ASF related training exercises.

What became more evident in the above processes was that there was insufficient attention to the civilian dimension of the ASF and that unless we actively seek to develop this aspect with an emphasis on establishing requisite

standards and procedures, this state of affairs would inevitably persist. This line of thinking gave further impetus to the Civilian Dimension Project.

With regards to the civilian dimension it was further shared that the AU should centrally manage a roster of mission administration, civilian experts for human rights, humanitarian, governance, and Disarmament, Demobilization and Rehabilitation (DDR), posts which would be filled by civilian professionals. In addition to this, the process should also involve tapping into the experiences of the resources of UN agencies such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), as well as of international financial institutions such as the World Bank (WB).

The floor was opened for questions and answers and the following key points were raised:

- o The question of whether there was need to establish a civilian and police component bodies similar to the MSC that would advice the PSC with on deployment and security related matters in so far as civilians and police were concerned or not. The military nature of the MSC was acknowledged as another example of the over preoccupation with military issues during the conceptualisation of the ASF, and that in future there would be need for further debate and discussion on how to go about improving the multidimensional character of the ASF in general and the MSC in particular;

- o There was a need to give greater consideration to the issue of the myriad of economic, political and security groupings that had emerged on the continent and to which AU member states belong. Particularly, it was suggested that there was a need to rationalise the membership of these various groupings to avoid AU member states having overlapping membership of the regional ASF brigades. The implications for successful interface in such instances needed to be

examined in the context of the developments in and around the ASF structure as well as to minimise the potential for a duplication of efforts and wastage of already scarce resources. Ultimately this issue remained a political one whose solution lies essentially with the political domain of the respective regions;

o   There was a need to establish a structure of civilian posts within the PSOD so as to ensure smooth and steady follow up and progress vis-à-vis developing the work of the ASF. The PSOD had recognized this limitation and had been working jointly with the ACCORD and the UNDPKO-AU Peace Support Team (PST) on consolidating a new staffing structure at the Division and also to reverse the current situation in which military personnel were undertaking the tasks and responsibilities that ideally were better suited for implementation by civilian personnel; and

o   It would be an important next step to develop a focus and future timetable for the further development of the police dimension of the ASF.

IV. Workshop Themes:

The programme agenda divided the Workshop discussions along the lines of the four (4) key themes including – *staffing*, *rostering*, *recruitment*, and *training*. Prior to each of the respective themes being discussed, a background paper thereon was shared to set the tone for the discussions and also to introduce the key areas for consideration. Following here from, the Workshop participants were divided into focussed working groups to consider and come up with the relevant recommendations. The entire group then reconvened in plenary to share and discuss the outcomes of the working group sessions.

Theme 1: Civilian Staff of the African Standby Force

1. Purpose

The goal of this part of the Workshop was to generate recommendations on the type and number of civilian positions needed in the ASF, so that the AU PSOD and Regional Brigades could have clear guidelines on the capacity of the civilian dimension that they need to develop. The Workshop was introduced to the relevant policies in place, as well as the main issues that should be taken into consideration when discussing the ASF civilian staff requirements[1].

The *Policy Framework for the Civilian Dimension of the ASF*[2], provides for a civilian led multidimensional mission management structure and various substantive and support civilian components. It also provided for a mission-level management structure that will typically consist of the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission (SRCC), one or more Deputy SRCCs, a Force Commander, a Commissioner of Police, various heads of substantive civilian components, and a Head of Mission Support[3]. Table A contains the full list and description of the substantive and mission support functions provided for in the Policy Framework.

2. ASF Civilian Staff

Since its inception in 2000 the AU has deployed three major multi-dimensional peace operations, namely the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) in 2003-2004, the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in 2004-2007 and the African Mission in Somalia

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[1] This section of the report is based on a background paper prepared for the workshop on the Staffing of the Civilian Dimension of the ASF prepared by Cedric de Coning, and available from ACCORD and the AU PSOD.

[2] This Policy Framework was considered and refined at the Technical Experts Workshop on the Civilian Dimension of the African Standby Force that took place from 29 August – 1 September 2006 at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Accra, Ghana. It was considered and noted at meeting of the African Chiefs of Defence and Security, and the meeting of the Ministers of Defence and Security of March 2008.

[3] In the Policy Framework, the term 'Mission Support' is used to refer to the administrative and logistics support function referred to as 'civilian administration' in the original ASF Policy Framework. This is the same terminology as is used by the UN and thus ensures inter-operability.

(AMISOM).[4] AMIB had about a dozen international civilian staff that consisted of a civilian head of mission, and his immediate support staff and advisors, as well as mission support staff. It also had approximately two-dozen international civilian staff that consisted of a civilian head of mission, as well as a deputy, their support staff, and substantive components such as political affairs and human rights, as well as mission support staff. AMISOM is the most ambitious mission yet, from a civilian staffing perspective, with a staffing table that provides for approximately 500 international and local civilian staff.[5] There has thus been a small but meaningful increase in civilian staff from AMIB to AMIS with a considerable increase potentially projected for AMISOM.

Table A: Substantive and Support Civilian AU Mission Functions Listed in the Policy Framework

Substantive Civilian Functions

Function	Description
Political Affairs	- Monitor and analyze the political aspects of the peace process and provide the mission leadership and headquarters with advice and reports on short, medium and long term developments and prospects - Undertake conflict prevention and peacemaking initiatives and partake fully in the implementation of any ceasefire and peace agreements as may be required - Draft the Reports of the SRCC to the Chairperson of the AU Commission - Facilitate the work of the Mission Analysis Cell (MAC)
Legal Advice	Monitor mission planning and operations and provide legal advice to the mission on the legal implications of any intended actions and their consequences
Planning & Coordination	- Facilitate the mission planning process (multi-year, annual, phase transitions, special events, drawing down, etc.) - Analyze and evaluate mission progress and provide periodic reports to mission leadership on progress against plans, problem areas and unintended consequences

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[4] We are not listing the various smaller observer missions or the recent enforcement mission in the Comoros, as the focus of the paper is multi-dimensional missions that include civilian staff.
[5] Note that planning projections have not yet been approved, nor deployed.

	• Facilitate coordination between mission, internal and external stakeholders and partners • Facilitate mission coordination processes and mechanisms, including the Mission Operations Centre (MOC) and the Mission Planning and Evaluation and Cell (MPEC)
Public Information	• Act as Spokesperson for the SRCC and mission • Develop and implement an effective public information campaign to keep the general public, mission members, stakeholders and partners informed of developments in support of the peace process and role and activities of the mission • Develop a media strategy, proactively gather and generate mission information and conduct regular press briefings • Develop regular public information guidelines that will assist mission staff with sharing a coherent mission view with all stakeholders and the media
Humanitarian Liaison	• Facilitate the establishment of a positive relationship between the humanitarian community and the various mission components, based on recognition and respect for humanitarian principles, including independence • Explore ways in which the mission can support the humanitarian community and coordinate mission support to the humanitarian community, in coordination with the Civil-Military Coordination (CIMIC) section of the military component, where relevant
Human Rights	• Facilitate the promotion and protection of human rights, with particular attention to women, children and other vulnerable persons, through: human rights monitoring and reporting, advise and education to the parties to the conflict, monitor and advice new institutions on human rights issues • Coordination human rights issues with stakeholders and partners
Gender	• Provide policy and technical advice to the senior mission leadership, the host government and partners on strategies for advancing gender equality and women's rights in accordance with the African Union instruments on gender equality and women's rights and the provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security; • Provide expert technical advice to inform policy and operational activities of Mission components and ensure the delivery of appropriate training for all levels of personnel;

	• Strengthen and expand partnerships including with the national machinery for the advancement of women's rights and gender equality; • Document and disseminate good practices and lessons learned to inform policy decisions.
Child Protection	• Facilitate and promote child protection in the peace process through advice, education and coordinating the child protection efforts among stakeholders internally and networking with external stakeholders and partners.
Conduct and Discipline	• Disseminate, promote and familiarise AU staff with the AU Peace Support Operation (PSO) Code of Conduct; • Monitor compliance with the Code of Conduct and the AU PSO Conduct and Discipline policies, and investigate all complaints according to the AU PSO Conduct and Discipline policies; • Undertake proactive training and monitoring to prevent cases of SEA
Rule of Law (RoL)	Judicial • Monitor the judicial process and provide advice and assistance to promote the independence of the judiciary, highlight any improper pressure on judges, prosecutors and courts • Provide expertise to improve the quality of justice and access to justice through reform of criminal law, policy and practice • Collect, analyze and disseminate criminal justice data • Assist the government to re-establish the authority of the judiciary and the rule of law throughout the territory • Coordinate closely with the police and other state security services to ensure a coherent and system-wide rule of law approach Corrections • Monitor and advise on reforming the correction services Police • Refer to section D - Police Component
Electoral Affairs	• Provide technical and logistical advice and support to the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) • Facilitate and participate in the monitoring of elections
DDR	• Assist the parties to the conflict, in consultation with all stakeholders and partners, with the design and implementation of the national DDR programme
Civil Affairs	• Facilitate liaison between the mission and national, provincial and local authorities and civil society to assist with the recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction of social services and the extension of state authority • Coordinate with other stakeholders and partners active in

	this area
	• Facilitate inter-communal dialogue and consultations as a confidence building measure
SSR	• Advise SRCC, Force Commander, Commissioner of Police and other relevant components on issues or initiatives associated with SSR.

Mission Support Functions

Function	Description
Human Resources	• Human resources services, including recruitment and contract management of local and international personnel, managing staff conduct and behaviour • Provision of staff welfare and counselling services • Provide insurance and medical services including emergency medical evacuation
Financial	• Financial management services, including budgeting, accounting, cash management, payments and contractor management
Procurement	• The procurement of all aspects of logistical support, including life cycle management [6], for the mission. Including provision of: mission assets to all mission components, fleet management, provision of an integrated communications infrastructure system (CIS) including design, installation, etc
Logistics	• Logistics and integrated support, including distribution of mission assets to all mission components, including vehicles, computers and stationery and provide bulk supplies of water, fuel products and foodstuffs
Engineering	• Provide accommodation, building management and civil engineering services
Geographical Information Services (GIS)	• Geographical information and mapping services
Information, Technology and Communications (ITC)	• Design, install, operate and maintain mission-wide communications, including telephone, radio and data systems, proprietary information management systems; internet; intra-mission mail and diplomatic pouch service
Transport	• Fleet management and maintenance services

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[6] Life Cycle Management includes the support of a logistic item from cradle to grave.

Contingent Owned Equipment (COE)	• Monitoring, database management and inspection of Contingent Owned Equipment
Security	• Provide security services to protect mission staff and assets
Integrated Training Services	• Provide induction briefings for all military, police and civilian staff • Support pre-deployment training by providing T/PCCs with mission specific information • Identify training needs and facilitate in-mission training; and • Act as a clearing house for out-of-mission training opportunities offered to mission staff

Two considerations need to be kept in mind when discussing the civilian dimension of African PSOs. The first is the financial reality and the second is the type of missions the AU and RECs/RMs are likely to undertake.

The financial realities dictate that AU and RECs/RMs PSOs that depend on external financial support will always be constrained in scope and size, compared to UN missions under similar circumstances that are funded through the UN assessed contribution system[7]. Compare for example the scope, size and budgets of the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and AMISOM. The AU should thus be conservative in its planning when it comes to the civilian dimension of AU and RECs/RMs PSOs so that we are in a position to do more with less, rather than plan for larger UN type civilian components that are unlikely to be approved or funded. The civilian dimension of the ASF should thus be designed with this limitation in mind, and provide for fewer, but more broadly functioned, civilian staff.

The second, and perhaps interlinked consideration, is the scope of missions the AU and RECs/RMs are most likely to undertake. If we follow the AMIB, AMIS and AMISOM trend then one can deduct that the AU is likely to undertake limited

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[7] AU, RECs/RMs are unlikely to receive the funding required to undertake long-term peacebuilding missions. The UN system has the comparative advantage of having, under one umbrella, the political, security, development and humanitarian instruments necessary for post conflict reconstruction and development.

stability-type of operations for a period of approximately 12 to 24 months, and that the UN may, in cases where sufficient stability has been achieved, follow-on with longer-term peacebuilding type missions. We have seen this trend with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) becoming the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), AMIB, the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) in Burundi, and AMIS the African Union – United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID).

Accordingly, ASF missions should be designed with the above mentioned considerations in mind and this implies, the capacity to deal with the political dimension of peace processes, conflict resolution, human rights, humanitarian liaison and environment shaping (public information). It also implies that such AU Commission (AUC) and RECs/RMs missions are unlikely to take on post-conflict reconstruction functions such as DDR, Security Sector Reform (SSR), and Rule of Law (RoL) reform, other than laying the foundations for these aspects in the initial stages of the transition process, and should at the minimum take these issues into consideration when planning and liaise with other key actors who will be primarily responsible for assessments and planning for post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding.

On the basis of the above considerations, for purposes of discussion, the Workshop was presented an AU civilian mission template that consists of the following functions:

- SRCC and Deputy SRCC
  - An Office of the SRCC that consist of:
    - Personal Staff of the SRCC and Deputy SRCC
    - Personal Protection for SRCC and other key mission personalities
    - Legal Advice
    - Gender Advice
    - Protection Advice
    - HIV/Aids Advice

- ▪ Conduct & Discipline Advice
- ▪ Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Advice
- Mission Planning and Coordination Unit
- Political Affairs Unit
- Human Rights Unit
- Public Information Unit
- Mission Support Component

The deployment of the civilian dimension can occur in stages, with the first group reflecting the most important elements without which a multi-dimensional mission should not deploy, building up in later phases until full civilian strength is reached. Considering the highly unstable operating environment in which an ASF mission might be deployed, the first phase of civilian deployment should start with the minimum essential staff and this capacity may be increased gradually as the risk reduces. It is important that the civilian, military and police components of the rapid deployment capability be trained together, and they should have the same time frames and standards. *See Table B for suggested phased deployments.*

Table B: The Deployment of the Civilian Members of an AU Mission

Civilian Personnel for Wave 1 = 15

O/SRCC x 6

1 x SRCC
1 x PA
4 x VIP Protection

Planning & Coordination x 1

- 1 x Planning & Coord

AU PK Force	**AU Police**	**Political Affairs** x 1	**Public Information** x 1	**Mission Support** x 6

- 1 x Pol Off

- 1 x Spokesperson

- 1 x CAO
- 1 x PA of CAO
- 1 x Finance & Personnel
- 1 x Admin & Log
- 1 x IT
- 1 x Coms

+ Local staff for HQ & Sector level
- Interpreters, Drivers, Administrative Assistants, etc.

Civilian Personnel for Wave 2 = 30

O/SRCC x 7

1 x SRCC
1 x PA
4 x VIP Protection
1 x Legal Adv

Mission Operations Centre (MOC)

Planning & Coordination x 5

- 2 x HQ & 3 x Sectors

AU PK Force	**AU Police**	**Human Rights** x 2	**Political Affairs** x 5	**Public Information** x 3	**Mission Support** x 9

- 2 x HRO

- 2 x HQ
- 3 x Sectors

- 1 x Spokesperson
- 2 x PIO

- 1 x CAO
- 1 x PA of CAO
- 2 x Finance
- 1 x Personnel
- 2 x Admin & Log
- 1 x IT
- 1 x Coms

Per Sector (Assumption is 3 Sectors)
- 1 x Political Affairs (Head of Sector)
- 1 x Planning & Coordination

+ Local staff for HQ & Sector level
- e.g. Interpreters, Drivers, Administrative Assistants, etc.

Civilian Personnel for Wave 3 = 60

O/SRCC x 18

1 x SRCC
1 x DSRCC
1 x SA
8 x VIP Protection
1 x Admin Asst
1 x Legal Adv
1 x Gender Adv
1 x Protection Adv
1 x HIV/Aids Adv
1 x Conduct & Discipline Adv
1 x Post-Conflict RD Adv

Mission Planning & Evaluation Cell (MPEC)

Mission Operations Center (MOC)

Mission Analysis Cell (MAC)

Planning & Coordination x 6
- 3 x HQ
- 3 x Sectors

Integrated Training Centre x 1

1 x Training Officer

AU Police

AU PK Force

Human Rights x 6
- 3 x HQ
- 3 x Sectors

Political Affairs x 6
- 3 x HQ
- 3 x Sectors

Public Information x 3
- 1 x Spokesperson
- 2 x PIO

Mission Support x 20
- 1 x CAO
- 1 x PA of CAO
- 3 x Finance
- 2 x Personnel
- 6 x Admin & Log
- 2 x IT
- 2 x Coms
- 3 x FAO (Sectors)

Per Sector (Assumption is 3 Sectors)
- 1 x Political Affairs (Head of Sector)
- 1 x Planning & Coordination
- 1 x Human Rights
- 1 x FAO

+ Local staff for HQ & Sector level
- - e.g. Interpreters, Drivers, Administrative Assistants, etc.

As alluded to earlier, the smaller size of the civilian dimension of AU missions, compared with, for instance, UN missions with similar mandates will mean that the AU civilian units will have to be more multi-disciplinary and cover more functional areas, with less specialisation. For instance, the Political Affairs section will have to do political analysis support the peace process and provide liaison services with national and local government authorities and civil society i.e. cover the same work that the political affairs and civil affairs units in a typical UN mission would cover. The Human Rights section will have to provide human rights advice, monitoring and training, including covering areas such as child protection, the protection of civilians, gender rights, etc. thus covering a number of related functions that will typically be handled by several different units in a UN peacekeeping operation. The capacity of these units can be augmented and strengthened by adding senior specialist advisors to the office of the SRCC so that the mission has specialist expertise at its disposal that can inform the planning, liaison and operational functions of the mission.

In addition to the civilian functions, another important consideration will be the number of civilians that the ASF should be able to deploy. Whilst it is understood that the type of functions and number of personnel of each mission will be determined by its mandate and available resources, the AU and Regional Planning Elements (PLANELMs) will need to develop a generic civilian capacity in each of the 'Brigades'.[8] For discussion purposes, it was suggested that each Brigade should develop a capacity that provides for approximately 60 civilian positions in the ASF structure, supported by a civilian standby roster with approximately 300 persons. *See Table C for a breakdown of these positions.*

Table C: Proposed ASF Brigade Civilian Capacity

Function	Position in Regional Brigade	Number in Roster
SRCC	1 x ASG/D1	10
DSRCC	1 x D1/D2	10
Special Assistant to the SRCC	1 x P3	10
Administrative Assistant to the SRCC/DSRCC	1 x GSA	10
Personal Protection for SRCC/DSRCC	8 persons ranging from P4 to P1	30
Legal Advisor	1 x P4	10
Gender Advisor	1 x P4	10
Protection Advisor	1 x P4	10
HIV/Aids Advisor	1 x P4	10
Conduct & Discipline Advisor	1 x P4	10
Post-Conflict Reconstruction Advisor	1 x P4	10
Planning and Coordination Unit, including Humanitarian Liaison	6 persons ranging from P5 to P3	20
Political Affairs Unit	6 persons ranging from P5 to P3	20
Human Rights Unit	6 persons ranging from	20

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[8] 'Brigade' is placed in parenthesis here, because, as noted by the March 2008 Ministers of Defence and Security meeting, the terminology is not useful when actually describing a multi-dimensional PSOs capacity that consists of military, police and civilian components, and that is headed by a multi-dimensional management structure, headed by civilian Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission (SRCC).

	P5 to P3	
Public Information Unit	3 persons ranging from P5 to P2	20
Training Unit	1 x P3	10
Mission Support	20 persons ranging from D2/P5 to P3	80
Totals	**60**	**300**

2. ASF PLANELM Structures

In order to manage the civilian components of the Regional Brigades it was suggested, for discussion purposes, that AU PSOD and each Regional PLANELM have at least four (4) civilian staff members, namely a t*raining and rostering officer*, *planning and coordination officer*, *logistics officer*, and a *head for the civilian component.* All four (4) should be able to participate in various aspects of the planning process, and should be able to act as liaison officers, when needed.

3. Key Issues Emerging from Plenary Discussion

In order for the AU PSOD and the Regional Brigade/PLANELMs to operationalise the Policy Framework and identify, train and incorporate the civilian dimension into the ASF, the Workshop needed to consider and generate specific recommendations as to:

- The type, and number, of civilian positions needed in each Regional Brigade;
- The type and number of civilian positions needed in the rapid deployment capacity of each Brigade; and
- The type, and number, of civilian positions needed in each Regional PLANELM.

The main issues that emerged from the discussions are highlighted below:

- *The type, and number, of civilian positions needed in each Regional Brigade:*
    - There was a general consensus/agreement on the numbers and positions provided for the Regional Brigades and the standby roster;
    - The exact roles and responsibilities of the various positions need to be explicitly detailed so as to avoid an overlap in functions;
    - Brigades can have less than the proposed number of sixty (60) persons and each REC/RM will have to decide upon the exact numbers based on the unique circumstances of the brigade in questions. Further more, the specific needs on the ground as indicated by a mission mandate will determine the exact number of persons to be deployed;
    - It was recommended that the staffing tables of each brigade include a humanitarian liaison officer/advisor;
    - The legal advisor and post conflict advisor should be increased to two persons each; and
    - The Head of Mission should be supported by a deputy Head of Mission

- *Number and types of civilian positions needed in the rapid deployment capability of each Brigade:*
    - At the outset, it was agreed that when it comes to the number and type of civilians required, one size does not fit all, and the realities and needs on the ground will be the guiding considerations;
    - The SRCC and his team would need to be deployed on the ground as a matter of priority;
    - There would be a need for humanitarian affairs officers, protection officers (to deal particularly with vulnerable groups such as women and children), and public information officers to keep the local population informed on the intervention and the evolving situation;
    - In situations where genocide has taken place and there are mass graves, forensic experts will be required – though it is recognised that in certain countries like Nigeria and Ghana, these may be police versus civilian persons; and

- It was recommended that in the second wave (See Table B), instead of two human rights officers, one can be replaced by a gender advisor.

- *The type, and number, of civilian positions needed in each Regional PLANELM:*
  - Regions should be free to propose their own variations to the basic structure and should be able to make respective determinations as to what officers should be brought in at the strategic level;
  - It was suggested that four key positions be established within the PLANELM, namely a t*raining and rostering officer*, *planning and coordination officer*, *logistics officer*, and a *head for the civilian component*;
  - The civilian components should be included in all Technical Assessment Missions; and
  - A 'civilian' civil-military coordinator should also be included.

Table D: Suggested Regional Brigade Civilian PLANELM Structure

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                    ┌─────────────────────────────┐
                    │  Head of Civilian Component │
                    │          PLANELM            │
                    └─────────────┬───────────────┘
          ┌───────────────────────┼───────────────────────┐
┌─────────────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────┐
│ Training and Rostering  │ │ Planning and Coordination│ │ Logistics Officer│
│        Officer          │ │         Officer          │ │                  │
└─────────────────────────┘ └──────────────────────────┘ └──────────────────┘
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Some of the more general aspects that were highlighted and discussed under the theme of staffing are represented below:

o Regional contributions were a major topic of discussion particularly as pertaining to the kind of capacity RECs/RMs were to develop for their respective regions and for the AU. The sources of the contributions of civilian capacity were also discussed and it was suggested that the AU recruitment process should primarily involve contributions from the RECs/RMs. In this way, RECs/RMs should be cognizant of the fact that as they develop their own capacity, this capacity may also be utilized for the AU. Whilst the RECs/RMs cannot provide the 600 – 1000 personnel as in the UN system, a realistic expectation/goal should be in place to guide and determine the structure of an AU PSO;

o It was shared that the office of the SRCC may not have the time and/or resources to undertake the daily coordination associated with interdepartmental briefings and meetings and that this and related tasks could be implemented by a chief of staff (a very senior manager). Alternatively it was suggested that considering the limited human resource capacity, such daily mission management functions could be undertaken by the Deputy SRCC who can also replace the SRCC when he is unavailable;

o There was a strong feeling that the mission and component planning cells should be distinguished from each other so as to ensure that there is no overlap and unnecessary multiplicity of roles and functions. Some planning will take place at mission level and will be undertaken by the mission planning cell consisting of military, police and civilian staff. Additionally, there should be component planning cells that will focus on planning for their individual components. The civilian component will thus have its own planning staff that will focus on planning civilian operations, as well as have representation on the mission planning cell;

o A question was raised in the area of humanitarian activities as to what would be the role of the mission in dealing with displaced persons? The

response was that the bodies responsible for the internally displaced persons (IDPs) would be the UN agencies, international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and local authorities, but there would be a need for coordination between them and the AU mission that will most likely be responsible for overall security. It was suggested that at the planning and coordination level, a humanitarian liaison position should be created to ensure good coordination between the AU mission and the humanitarian community;

o Some participants were of the strong opinion that a generic civilian staffing structure should be developed that could work across the regions, this to the end of ensuring harmonization of approach throughout the continent;

o The situation on the ground, and the time and financial constraints involved in preparing and brining civilians on board would be the key factors determining the numbers of civilians required at each deployment phase;

o Some comments for reflection focused on the element of time with regard to the waves of civilian deployment. The timing of waves is critical and sometimes difficult to predict, however it would be important that the most experienced people are deployed in the first wave so that they can adequately deal with functional gaps; and

o There was a note that when an African PSO is handed over to the UN, a core AU presence should remain on the ground to ensure continuity. The AU would typically establish an AU office that would replace its PSO when such a mission ends, or are handed over to the UN.

<u>**Theme 2: Overview of Recruitment Options**</u>

1. Purpose

The goal of this part of the Workshop was to generate recommendations on the types and methods of recruitment of civilian personnel for the ASF, so that the AU PSOD and RECs/RMs can have clear guidelines as to how they should go about identifying and recruiting civilian personnel for the ASF. The Workshop was briefed on the relevant policies in place as well as the key areas for consideration when discussing recruitment of ASF civilian staff[9].

2. Background

Recruitment refers to the identification and hiring of civilian staff for the ASF and occurs in two contexts, firstly civilian staff for the PLANELMs at the AU PSOD and Regional Brigades, and secondly civilians on standby for potential deployment as part of the Regional Brigades themselves. For the former we are thus referring to the recruitment of permanent or contract staff working for the PSOD and the regional PLANELMs, and for the latter we are referring to recruiting persons into a standby arrangement, and involving them in the training courses and exercises meant to operationalise the ASF, with a view of them being pre-screened, pre-trained and potentially available for recruitment for future AU or REC/RM PSOs. For the latter context, some of the civilians can be assigned to fill specific positions for Brigade exercises, etc.

Civilian PSO staff differ from military and police personnel in two important aspects. Firstly they are not necessarily civil servants working for AU Member States made available to the ASF on offer or secondment basis. They can also be individuals directly recruited from the private sector or civil society. For instance, most civilians working in UN peacekeeping operations are individually recruited by the UN on contract basis for specific missions. Secondly, it is not possible to assign individuals to positions in a Regional Brigade and assume that they will be

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[9] This section of the report is based on a background paper prepared for the workshop on the Recruitment of the Civilian Dimension of the ASF prepared by Cedric de Coning, and available from ACCORD and the AU PSOD.

readily available for deployment in the same way that an infantry battalion is available to the ASF once offered. It is thus necessary to recruit more staff into a standby roster system. In this way, several persons will be available for each positions identified. Some skills needed may differ from mission to mission, for instance language skills, and it may thus be wise to have several people on strength that can fill the same position, but with different language and other such skills.

Once the Brigade PLANELMs have developed civilian staffing tables, and defined the positions contained therein (job descriptions), they can then start to recruit civilian personnel into a standby roster for the Brigades. It is foreseeable that the individual vacancy announcements may become over subscribed (more applicants per post that can be accommodated in the standby roster) and in this instance, apart from the requirements listed in the job description and vacancy announcement (such as level of education and experience and health) the regional PLANELMs will likely also have to consider issues such as gender balance, language balance, religious balance and geographical representation. The Regional Brigade and AU will thus have to address the kind of balances it would like to see reflected in its rosters. Attention to these types of details will also ensure that any potential future AU or REC/RM PSO will have at its disposal personnel that have the requisite skills necessary to operate anywhere in its potential area of deployment.

3. Secondments & Direct Recruitment

The Workshop was also tasked with considering whether the ASF should make use of *secondments* from Member States or *direct hiring* by the AU or RECs/RMs. The implications of each should be carefully weighed.

3.1 Secondments

Secondments imply that Member States respond to PLANELM vacancy announcements by offering some of its nationals, most probably currently serving civil servants, to fill these civilian positions. It may also imply, depending on how

the arrangement is structured, that the sending state retains the responsibility for the basic salary of the persons it is seconding to such a PLANELM, whilst the PLANELM assumes responsibility for any additional allowances and related costs. Most, if not all, military and police staff officers currently serving in regional PLANELMs are seconded to these bodies, so both the PLANELMs and the Member States are familiar with these arrangements. Most civilians working for the AUC and RECs/RMs, and for similar bodies such as the UN or the EU, are however individually recruited. It is thus important to understand the merits, and demerits of both types of recruitment processes.

3.1.1 Merits of Secondment

- Recruitment is made easier in that the onus is on Member States to offer, instead of on the PLANELM to fill positions. When there are vacancies the PLANELM can push the problem back to the willingness of Member States to offer personnel;

- If Member States contribute to the cost of the participation of their nationals in the Regional Brigade's roster, training and exercises, it will lesson the Brigade's dependency on support from partners;

- In some cases, specialised skills may not exist in the private sector, and in such cases PLANELMs can turn to Member States to second such specialised staff.

3.1.2 Demerits of Secondments

- Member States may be reluctant to release some of their civil servants for service with the regional PLANELMs, especially when these persons are fulfilling critical functions in their national civil service;

- Some of the specialised categories of staff may not have equivalents in the civil service, or may be in such short supply that Member States may not be willing to release their specialists;

- Thus PLANELM may not necessarily get the most qualified or best suited personnel, as they will have to make do with what are offered by Member States;

- Once a person has been offered through secondment, and is found to be unsuitable, it is extremely difficult to replace them as issues of national sentiments and formal PLANELM to Member State relations have to be factored into consideration. The UN and others have found this problem to be particularly difficult to deal with;

- Accepting personnel offered by Member States may make it difficult for the PLANELM to meet all its criteria, e.g. gender, language, religion, geographical representation;

3.2 Direct Hiring

Direct hiring of staff implies that the individual is hired on his own merit on contract basis by the organization responsible for the PSO, e.g. the AU in the cases of AMIB or AMIS, or a REC like ECOWAS. This typically implies that staff vacancies are advertised in public and through Member States; that applicants apply in their individual capacities; that the responsible organization, selects a short list of candidates, interviews those selected, makes a final choice, and makes an offer of employment to the selected candidate. If the candidate accepts the offer, then an employment contract is entered into with the candidate. The net effect is that the responsible organization hires civilian staff on an individual basis from the civil service, private sector or civil society. If the person so hired is a serving civil servant, he/she should be released from the service for duty with the PLANELM on either a secondment basis, or on an unpaid leave basis, or released all-together, depending on the respective policies of the Member State and the responsible organization.

3.2.1 Merits of Direct Hiring

- The key advantage of the direct hiring system is that the responsible organization can hire individuals on merit;

- The responsible organization can satisfy its gender, language, religious and geographic balance requirements more easily;

- Once persons are hired, the responsible organization employing the individual has control over the evaluation, advancement or release of the person on merit.

3.2.2 Demerits of Direct Hiring

- There may be highly qualified staff available in the civil service of Member States that may not be interested in such positions, if they are not advertised on secondment basis and thus require them to leave the Civil Service;

- There may be specialised skills that are not available in the private sector or civil society;

- Direct hiring may require more effort on the side of the responsible organization and may take longer and require more resources;

- Direct hiring of civilian staff implies that the responsible organisation would assume full responsibility for the remuneration of its civilian staff. This arrangement may put more stress on the financial resources of the organization and eventually lead to over reliance on external partner support.

3.3 Combining Secondments and Direct Hiring

It is also possible for the AU and RECs/RMs to choose to make use of both systems. It may use secondments for certain positions, and direct hiring for others, depending on the availability of certain skills, or on the availability of resources. Or it may choose to use secondments as a first choice, and then revert to direct hiring to fill those positions that they are not able to fill via secondments, or to meet some of its own criteria, such as gender, language, religion and geographic representation.

4. Recruitment for PLANELMs

Recruiting staff for service in PLANELMs should follow the normal procedures for hiring staff in their respective organizations, or could be a test case for the specific hiring processes established for ASF purposes.

5. Recruitment for Regional Brigades

The recruitment of civilian staff for Regional Brigades can take two forms. In regions where a small Brigade HQ exists, there would be a requirement for civilian staff to be hired following the same process as would be required for hiring staff for the PLANELMs.

In most cases, however, civilian staff will be recruited onto standby rosters for the Regional Brigades, and this process requires special consideration as it is a completely different form of 'recruitment'. It differs from 'normal recruitment' in that the persons are not offered employment directly, but placed on a standby roster that may eventually lead to employment. However, in order to ensure a fast track employment process, the personnel are pre-selected for specific appointments, so that if the need arises, they are offered the opportunity and their employment contracts can be processed in the shortest possible time frame.

This process would require that regional PLANELMs need a recruitment policy, a standby roster, and a rapid recruitment, employment and deployment process that can fast track PSO requirements.

The civilian standby rosters need to be designed on the basis of the civilian staffing tables agreed upon by the PLANELM (*see Table C*). Each position should be filled by several persons on the standby roster, to give a range of personnel to choose from to meet mission specific criteria (language, etc.). When the standby roster is designed a ratio of persons per post would need to be decided on for each category of post.

Such a roster would thus be populated by following a kind of recruitment process:

- advertising the positions,

- screening and selecting applicants,

- selecting applicants,

- entering into some kind of contract or arrangement with them,

- exposing them to training opportunities, and making use of them for Regional Brigade exercises, and

- replacing them with new personnel when they are no longer available.

6. Rapid Recruitment and Deployment

The type of contract or arrangement entered into requires special consideration. Depending on the level of rapid deployment required, a PLANELM may want to enter into a temporary contract with staff for a limited period to ensure their availability. For instance, should Regional Brigade X be placed on high readiness status for a certain period, e.g. 30 days, the PLANELM may wish to ensure that it is able to deploy the required civilian staff on short notice, and thus pre-select, from the roster, the required civilian staff for the first wave of deployment, and offer them a special-type of contract wherein they agree to be available for deployment for that set period of time. This implies, for instance, that they agree not to take up other employment over that period, or that they are required to give a certain number of days notice if they do. Such contracts may not necessarily require a remuneration component but could include a nominal amount to meet legal requirements, or include an honorarium.

PLANELMs may also wish to make use of such short-term contracts to recruit civilian staff for Regional Brigade exercises. Such an arrangement will both ensure the availability of key civilian staff for such exercises, and test the PLANELM, or REC/RMs short-term rapid recruitment/employment/deployment systems.

Another possibility is for the PLANELMs to, at any given time, have virtual contracts in place with a number of civilian staff that can be activated at short notice when needed and following a specific procedure. In other words, it can enter into a formal recruitment process with a number of civilian staff that are on a standby roster, and go through all the selection and screening processes necessary, up to and including entering into a draft or virtual contract with the prospective employee. In this case, should employment become necessary, there will be no delays due to screening, checking of qualifications and references, obtaining of health certificates, etc. as they would already have been done. The only steps necessary would be a formal offer of employment, and acceptance by the candidate.

The same process can be followed, and tested, for short-term contracts for participation in Brigade exercises. Having such a process in place would add greatly to the operational capability and high-readiness of a Regional Brigade, but would also imply certain maintenance costs, as the number of persons on this level of readiness will have to be constantly maintained, and this implies continuously processing new candidates as others leave the system due to changes in their availability status.

The third element of the process is a rapid deployment capacity, and the PLANELMs would have to consider what systems are necessary to ensure that civilian staff, once employed, can be sent to the mission area as soon as possible.

7. Key Issues Emerging from Plenary Discussion

In order to ensure the smooth, and in some cases rapid, recruitment of civilian personnel for AU and RECs/RMs PSOs, the regional PLANELMs need to consider a number of issues related to recruitment, employment and deployment of civilian staff. The Workshop was thus required to consider and make recommendations as to:

- the type of employment arrangements, e.g. secondments from Member States, direct hiring of individuals, or a combination of both;

- the type of contracts that may be needed for the different categories of employment, e.g. for PLANELM staff, for Brigade staff, i.e. persons on the civilian standby roster, and a sub-category earmarked for rapid deployment (and which may need contracts that can be activated on short notice).

The Workshop group deliberated the issue of recruitment under three key priority areas as indicated below:

- Recruitment methods: *secondment* versus *direct hiring*

    o It was recommended that recruitment policies be developed to guide the AU PSOD and the RECs/RMs in the process for acquiring civilian staff;

    o The majority of participants viewed the process of secondment as an attractive option as it would serve to ensure member states buy-in and ownership, more than the process of direct hiring. With secondment, member states could be actively engaged in the process of identifying and nominating key civilians;

    o *Headhunting*, i.e. actively seeking to fill specific positions, regardless of whether through *secondments* or *direct hiring*, was also viewed as an acceptable method for recruitment of specific key positions;

    o In considering candidates for recruitment, the RECs/RMs should take advantage of the diversity and scope of expertise that exists within civil society;

    o Whilst some felt that the position of the head of the civilian component of the PLANELM should be filled through the process of secondment (as it allowed for linkage and ownership between the member states and the respective PLANELM) others felt equally strongly that the head of the civilian component should be

selected through a process of direct hiring as this allowed for continuity and institutional memory. It was further emphasized that the head of the civilian component should have significant mission experience, should be politically neutral and should pledge allegiance and commitment to achieving the objectives of the region and not those of the contributing country, all of which further lend to the argument that the individual be recruited via the *direct hiring* option. In deciding upon which method to employ, it was felt that the respective REC/RM or AUC, should be given the flexibility to determine the most suitable option;

o With regards to the more technical civilian positions within the PLANELM, there was a general agreement that these could be recruited through a process of *direct hiring* so as to ensure access to a broader pool of expertise that may either not reside within the capacity of member states and/or expertise that due to a limited supply thereof may not be available for release to the PLANELM.

- *The types of contracts that would be needed for PLANELM staff:*

  o At a minimum, the contracts should be for two (2) to three (3) years (with a six (6) month probationary period) so as to allow for more depth and sustainability and also to guard against a loss of institutional memory. At the AUC, three-year secondment periods are the current practise and this could also be applied to the RECs/RMs. The contracts should be renewable and should also be timed in such a manner that there is no loss of institutional memory and no gaps between staff changes;

  o There was a concern raised that the fact that donors and partners also determine the length of contracts, may limit the control of the AUC and the RECs/ RMs in deciding the exact timeframes for these contracts.

- *With regards to contracts for the Brigade Staff:*

  o Short-term rotational contracts of up to three (3) years (renewable) could be explored;

  o It was suggested that within the brigade, four (4) to six (6) positions be pre-selected and placed on stand-by. A memorandum of understanding (MOU) or letter of intent would then be concluded between the individuals and the roster. When an individual determined that he/she was no longer available for standby, he/she would have to inform the brigade so that a replacement could be identified.

Theme 3: Proposed Roster Models for the ASF

1. Purpose

During this section of the Workshop, the concept of Civilian Standby Rosters as a tool for rapid mobilization and deployment of skilled civilians for peace support and humanitarian missions was considered[10].

2. Background

In light of the difficulties associated with identifying and recruiting civilian personnel in a wide array of PSOs and post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction tasks, a number of standby rosters have been developed to increase the efficiency and speed with which civilian personnel can be recruited and deployed.

Once a standby roster is populated with suitable candidates, it offers obvious benefits as a recruitment tool including, speed and responsiveness; transparency; homogeneity; accessibility and low maintenance costs. Rosters also encourage merit-based selection as the easiest way of filtering candidates is by searching for relevant qualifications and experience.

The use of civilian standby rosters in various forms has led to the creation of a number of different types of rosters. The UN currently recognizes seven (7) national rosters[11], two (2) regional rosters[12], and three (3) international NGO rosters[13].

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[10] This section of the report is based on a background paper prepared for the workshop on the Rostering of the Civilian Dimension of the ASF prepared by Nhlanhla, and available from ACCORD and the AU PSOD.

[11] Canadian Civilian Reserve (CANADEM), Canada; France Cooperation Internale (FCI, France) ; ZIF Experts Pool, Centre for International Peace operations (ZIF, Germany); Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights (NORDEM, Norway); Swiss Pool for Civilian Peacebuilding; UK Stabilisation Unit; Civilian Reserve Corps, Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (USA)

[12] OSCE—Rapid Expert Assistance and Cooperation Teams (REACT); Roster of Civilian Crisis Management Experts, EU Commission

[13] African Civilian Standby Roster for Humanitarian and Peacebuilding Missions (AFDEM); International Legal Assistance Consortium; Register of Engineers for Disaster Relief

3. Costs

While there are obvious benefits associated with utilizing a roster system, the development of rosters inevitably involves considerable costs and expertise. The most significant human resource and financial cost of roster management relates to the process of screening and 'clearing' candidates for placement on a roster and then ensuring their retention. These costs vary with the size of the roster, the number of applications it contains, and the screening strategies that the ASF will decide to adopt.

A number of strategies have been employed by, for instance, the AU Conflict Management Division roster the African Civilian Standby Roster for Humanitarian and Peace-building Missions (AFDEM), and other renowned roster/database institutions, to limit the human resource/screening costs. These include: limiting the size of the roster; adopting just-in-time, competitive screening; reducing costs of 'in-house' screening; incremental screening in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity; developing targeted advertising strategies; introducing automated, electronic techniques to filter out unsuitable applicants; pooling personnel information; and linkages (e.g. with training and deploying agencies).

4. Effectiveness

Roster effectiveness and functionality is largely determined by the personal will, commitment and availability of the candidates. An ASF Roster would have to devise commitment and retention mechanisms to ensure that candidates remain committed to availing themselves for AU and REC/RM deployments. If not, resources will be invested in candidates who may not have an obligation to make themselves available for the AU missions. One option that needs to be considered is Member States seconding civilian personnel through the RECs/RMs to the ASF roster, but this adds additional layers of bureaucracy and more stakeholders that need to be coordinated, first at national level, and then at regional level.

5. Potential ASF Roster Models

Three potential models, which illustrate the different options available to the AU and RECs/RMs, were presented to the Workshop. The models were not exhaustive but formed a base for discussion.

5.1 Model 1: ASF Rapid Deployment Roster and an External Roster

The ASF may create and manage an internal Rapid Deployment Roster of pre-screened, pre-trained, and pre-agreed 'available' individuals who are already working in the AUC, REC/RM system. These individuals will provide the core staff for the mission start-up phase, i.e. for the first 60 to 100 days of a new mission. Agreements have to be reached and honoured so that when individuals are needed they will be released within an agreed time-frame by their respective departments. By having an internal Rapid Deployment Roster, core positions can be filled by individuals who already have the knowledge of the AU and REC/RM systems, procedures, culture and ethics. It also allows the ASF the lead-time in which to recruit and deploy the medium to long-term staff that will replace the mission start-up group deployed via the Rapid Deployment Roster.

For the second phase of recruitment, the AU may enter into a formalized agreement, possibly in the form of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), with one or more already existing African rosters. The agreement signed between the two parties shall set the parameters of the relationship with clear roles and responsibilities of each party. The MoU will be a mechanism that assures the AU, or RECs/RMs, of commitment and responsiveness from an organization functioning from outside its structures.

These independent rosters will, based on the MOUs, establish and maintain a civilian standby roster of African specialists on behalf of the AU and the RECs/RM. The number and type of candidates will be determined by the AU and RECs/RM and specified in the MOU. The candidates should be pre-trained and screened, against specific ASF approved positions.

If the AU or RECs/RMs require a rapid deployment capability, then a number of candidates, as determined by the AU and RECs/RMs, can be placed in a high-readiness category. Typically this will imply that this group has pre-approved contracts that can be activated within a short time frame, and if their availability needs to be guaranteed they can be asked to sign a short-term availability contract, against a retainer, on a (thirty) 30 day high readiness (24hour notice period) period. This is obviously an expensive capacity, and it is recommended that the AU and RECs/RMs rather make use of the internal Rapid Deployment Roster suggested earlier, for its rapid response capacity.

The use of independent rosters for the medium- to long-term deployment needs of the ASF system allows for more effective and efficient use of roster resources, as the same roster capacity can be used for other AU and REC/RM purposes, e.g. election monitoring, mediation support, post-conflict reconstruction, etc. and it is also flexible enough to serve the UN and other international and regional agencies and NGOs. The AFDEM roster, for instance, has current agreements with AMISOM, the Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights (NORDEM), the Swedish Rescue Services, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and ACCORD.

5.1.1 Operational Arrangements of Model 1

- The ASF will identify what type of civilian personnel it needs, as well as the number of personnel in each category it is likely to deploy, and generate generic vacancy announcements for these positions;

- The independent roster will use the generic vacancies to identify, select and register individuals that meet the ASF requirements onto the roster;

- Candidates selected for the ASF roster will need to meet the education, training and experience requirements specified in the vacancy announcements, and undergo further specific ASF training in order to remain active on the roster. Some of these candidates will be selected by

the AU and RECs/RMs to participate in ASF and Regional Brigade exercises;

- The MoU between the AUC, RECs/RMs and the roster(s) will specify a liaison arrangement that will ensure regular reporting, monitoring and verification of the candidates on the roster, as well as regular training and exercises to ensure that the recruitment arrangements between the roster and the AUC or RECs/RMs are regularly tested and exercised;

- Within the AUC and RECs/RMs structures a specific focal point, e.g. one of the civilian planning officers in the AUC and REC/RM PLANELMs, should assume responsibility for the AUC or REC/RM roster, both the internal Rapid Deployment Roster, and the external medium- to long-term roster.

5.1.2 Merits of Model 1

- Using already serving AU employees for the crucial role of a mission start-up Rapid Deployment Roster assures that the initial mission structures are staffed by personnel familiar with AU procedures, rules and regulations. This will improve mission effectiveness, especially in the first crucial months when staff who know the system will be much more effective;

- Utilizing already existing independent rosters that have experience in roster management means the ASF will take advantage of already established systems, and will thus save on the time and resources that would otherwise be invested in establishing such systems;

- Creation of rosters requires a lot of resources both human and financial. Independent rosters have their own resources, and by entering into an agreement with an already existing roster, the ASF will leverage existing investments. AFDEM is, for instance, funded by Norway, which means that the AUC and RECs/RMs can rather use their own resources for other purposes.

5.1.3 Demerits of Model 1

- One of the biggest challenges for the mission start-up phase is the commitment of the various departments that will have to release their staff from their crucial day-to-day duties, at short notice with, no immediate replacements. The UN DPKO tried to establish a similar internal rapid deployable system, but it was not effective because departments were reluctant to release their staff, and the missions often extended the staff contracts beyond the initial 90 day period because they were unable to find replacements within that period.

5.2 Model 2: ASF/REC/RM Integrated Roster

The second model provides for an ASF roster, established and managed by the AU, with subsidiary rosters at each of the RECs/RMs, linked-up into one overall ASF Roster. Candidates registered onto the RECs/RMs rosters shall be made available for the AU-led missions as well as missions led by the respective RECs/RMs. The Main ASF Roster shall retain control over the selection process for ASF missions. There will be a roster coordinator at the AUC and at each REC/RM that will manage each respective roster and liaise between the REC/RM and the AUC. The AUC should provide a central database capacity and staff, with satellite capacities at each REC/RM. If the AU and RECs choose to make use of secondments from Member States, mechanisms can be created to establish further subsidiary satellite coordinators and databases at the national level. Training of roster candidates will be coordinated by the AUC and REC/RM training officers.

5.2.1 Merits of Model 2

- The rosters will be owned and managed by the AUC and RECs/RMs.

5.2.2 Demerits of Model 2

- The AUC, and most of the RECs/RMs, do not have the additional staff capacity, civilian specialists, and resources to establish, maintain and

follow-up on such civilian standby rosters. If this option is preferred, additional donor support and external expertise will be necessary;

- If the AUC and RECs/RMs choose to make extensive use of secondments in this model it may end-up having less influence on choosing the best personnel for any given mission, as it will have to make use of the personnel offered by the Member States. Member States may face the same problems as the AUC and RECs/RMs, i.e. they may be reluctant to make crucial staff available for AU or REC/RM missions, especially at short notice;

- This option will require a significant investment in additional resources for the AUC and RECs/RMs;

- This model risks duplication with the independent rosters.

5.3 Model 3: ASF Stand Alone Roster

In this model the AUC will be responsible for the development and maintenance of an ASF civilian standby roster with no direct links to similar rosters, if any, at the level of the RECs/RMs. The roster could be housed at the PSOD or the Human Resources Department of the AUC, and cater specifically for AU PSOs. The PSOD/Human Resources Department will be responsible for the development and management of the roster as well as identifying, selecting, registering and training of candidates from across the continent. The assumption underlying this model is that it will be too expensive, both in terms of human and financial resources, to operationalise Model 1 and 2, which required, apart from establishing a roster at the AU level, also establishing a roster at each REC/RM (model 2) or an independent roster (Model 1). Model 3 thus assumes that is would be more effective and efficient to develop this capacity only at the level of the AU.

Also, if the AUC relies on the RECs/RMs, and if all the RECs/RMs have not developed their respective regional civilian rosters, the AUC may end up in a situation where it is unable to ensure overall continental representation in its missions. If the AU takes responsibility for creating a continental standby roster it can ensure that all the regions, languages, religions, etc. are proportionally represented. Model 3 is most in-line with the way the UN DPKO operates, and the standby roster and recruitment system can then be designed as one overall system, where those recruited also automatically become part of the roster, for potential future deployments.

5.3.1 Merits of Model 3

- The AUC will be in full control of the roster and thus its own mission needs, and it would thus not be dependent on independent rosters, or the RECs/RMs;

- The standby roster and recruitment system can be integrated, similar to the DPKO system.

5.3.2 Demerits of Model 3

- This option will require a significant commitment and investment in additional resources for the AUC. If not, there is a danger that it will end up with more-or-less the existing recruitment system, without a meaningful standby roster capacity;

- The model risks duplication with those RECs/RMs that are planning to establish their own standby rosters in line with their own regional and overall ASF expectations;

- The model also risks duplication with the independent rosters

Two key recommendations were proposed to the Workshop including that:

- The AU and RECs/RMs will have to take into account the potential resources available for establishing this capacity, as well as the

likelihood of investing these resources in the context of competing priorities;

- Models 1 and 2 would establish the most wide-ranging and inter-locking capacities, whilst Model 3 would establish the most focused capacity. Model 1 was probably the most pragmatic option as it provides for a limited internal Rapid Deployment Capacity at the level of the AU and RECs/RMs (although not all the RECs/RMs are likely to operationalise such a capacity equally), as well as an outsourced medium to long-term standby roster capacity.

6. Key Issues Emerging from Plenary Discussion

With the above discussion in mind, the Workshop group aimed also to consider the various rostering options for the ASF. Three (3) panellists presented papers which shared regional and international best practise, an overview of standby rosters and the civilian database that is being established by the Conflict Management Division (CMD) of the AUC. The key discussion areas are highlighted below:

o Generally participants were in favour of Model 1: ASF Rapid Deployment Roster and an External Roster as it catered also to the issue of rapid deployment. Additionally, it was suggested that the model should also include timeframes for the deployment of the various personnel. The Model had more chances of being '*live*' and less costly than the other proposed models. One of the disadvantages however with Model 1 was that some felt that it does not afford the AUC and RECs/RMs with sufficient ownership of the rosters. It was recommended as a means of overcoming this limitation, over and above the MoU and day-to-day coordination, is to establish a governing board consisting of representatives from the AUC and RECs/RMs that could meet regularly to oversee the management of the independent roster(s) on behalf of the AU and RECs/RMs;

o It was recommended that the AUC should provide civilian start-up capacity for Wave 1(*Table B*) deployments whilst the rosters for the RECs/RMs should be utilised for Wave 2 and Wave 3 deployments. However, it was stated that the AUC and RECs/RMs would in reality not have the ability to deploy even the first fifteen (15) to twenty (20) civilian staff from within existing AU or REC/RM staff, because the AU and RECs/RMs do not have 15 to 20 people to spare, with these requisite skills, that it can deploy for a period of 60 to 90 days, due to human resource limitations. The AUC and RECs/RMs Human Resources departments also do not have the additional capacity, at present, to manage the range of tasks required for civilian rostering and recruitment for the ASF;

o It was strongly emphasized that which ever model was decided upon, it would need to be simple, manageable and easy to use and resource. Quality control mechanisms should also be built into the roster and these can include amongst others aspects competencies, qualifications and training history of the individuals. These individuals should also be exposed to periodic training, testing and should also be incorporated in simulation exercises;

o The roster should be populated through governments/ministries of foreign affairs; NGOs; civil society organizations and public advertisements;

o There needs to be awareness that there could be competitors vying for a limited pool of African civilian experts such as the UN, NGOs, etc. which could present a challenge to building and sustaining a healthy roster;

o A recommendation was made that a technical Workshop focusing on rostering – the process, required infrastructure, technical expertise, etc. be organised so as to increase understanding and discuss ways in which to coordinate the development of an ASF roster. The Workshop would bring together the AUC and RECs/RMs as well as institutions and individuals who have rostering expertise and knowledge;

o As a core principle, the AUC should assume the lead and should work towards the establishment of an inter-linked network amongst the Commission and regions, coordinated by the Commission.

Theme 4: Training for the Civilian Staff of the ASF

1. Purpose

This aspect of the Workshop aimed at discussing the issue of training of civilians for ASF PSOs which is a critical consideration bearing in mind that the operational capability of the ASF will be dependent amongst other factors on the level of preparedness of its various components[14].

2. Background

One of the key features associated with the paradigm shift from traditional to complex multidimensional peacekeeping has been the increase and diversification of the civilian functions included in peacekeeping mandates including inter alia electoral assistance, promotion of human rights, delivery of humanitarian assistance and protection of vulnerable groups. The expansion of civilian roles has also resulted in increasing training needs for civilian peacekeepers. The fact that civilians are not deployed in identifiable groups like the military and police components, and the fact that they represent a large number of different functions, resulted in training for civilians happening in a largely ad hoc fashion. As a result there is a lack of sufficiently trained and qualified civilian personnel (in terms of knowledge and skills) for PSOs.

Over the last decade, however, the situation has improved owing to, amongst other factors, greater recognition and understanding of the roles and functions of civilian peacekeepers and an increase in the amount of funding available for civilian training both on the African continent and beyond. A number of training initiatives have been developed by various African peacekeeping training centres to provide specialised training for civilian peacekeepers. Most African peacekeeping training centres also offer opportunities for integrated civilian, police and military training. In addition, African civilian personnel have been

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[14] This section of the report is based on a background paper prepared for the workshop on the Training of the Civilian Dimension of the ASF prepared by Yvonne Kasumba, and available from ACCORD and the AU PSOD.

able to benefit from peacekeeping and peacebuilding related trainings offered by international institutions

However, the need to develop a civilian capacity for the ASF will significantly increase the need for civilian peacekeeping training, and calls for a much more systematic approach than has been followed to date.

3. Levels and types of training required

Most civilians who are currently deployed in UN or AU missions have not benefited from any specific peacekeeping training. Individual civilian peacekeepers are experts in their chosen profession, e.g. lawyers, journalist, political analysts, etc. but they need guidance on how to apply that expertise in the highly physically and psychologically challenging, multicultural and dynamic peace operations environment. Being a lawyer in such a context can be an altogether different thing to being a lawyer in a 'normal' peace time and national context.

Training for civilian peacekeepers in the ASF context could include the following types/levels of training:

3.1 *Mission Preparedness (Generic) Training* – foundation course for civilians interested in serving in a variety of roles in AU missions that aim to provide participants with the core knowledge and skills they would require to serve in PSOs. Such training can also be provided to civilians who are already deployed in missions with the aim of improving upon their knowledge and qualifications. This training should orientate participants to the key functional areas and the main actors involved in AU PSOs, and would include inter alia: the modern AU PSO environment; the roles and responsibilities of the civilian, police and military peacekeepers; key functional skills such as assessments, planning, coordination, monitoring and evaluation; and cross-cutting issues such as human rights; gender; protection, conduct & discipline, HIV/Aids and cultural awareness;

3.2   *Mission Specific Training* – tailored training to reflect the mandate or specific environmental context within which a mission is deployed, as well as reflecting the specific roles and responsibilities of the civilian, police and military peacekeepers; other partners and local authorities; and the specific political, security, development and social-cultural context of the conflict system where the mission will be deployed;

3.3   *Specialization Training* - advanced training that targets civilians that are already engaged in, or earmarked for, specialist activities (for example conflict management, mission planning, coordination, monitoring and evaluation, and management). The training aim is to build on the existing skills of the civilian peacekeepers, and to prepare them for more specialized, more senior, or management positions, by learning from resource persons with extensive knowledge in that particular field. Specialized courses may be offered as mission preparedness, mission specific or in-mission courses, as appropriate.

3.4   *End of Mission "Training"'* - the learning process both for the individual civilian specialist and the ASF should not terminate once the individual's contract expires. Some form of end of mission training should be provided and should be focused on such aspects as debrief and evaluation to help the ASF draw out lessons learned which may inform future training.

4. Training of civilian staff of the AUC and the secretariats of RECs or RMs should be targeted as a matter of priority. Persons working at this level, do their regular tasks without necessarily appreciating the fact that they also have a role to play in terms of support to, or as participants in, AU or REC/RM PSOs. A lack of awareness by persons operating at this level, especially those in positions of leadership and who have critical decision making roles can serve to hinder the development and eventual deployment of AU or REC/RM PSOs. They need to understand that preparation for and deployment of peace support missions is an all

encompassing affair, involving, for instance all AUC departments either directly or indirectly, and not limited to only the AU PSOD. This requires the involvement of Political Affairs, finance, administration, human resources, legal departments and so forth. Training at this level should focus on general orientation to PSOs and the roles of their respective departments in preparing and supporting these operations.

5. Course Curriculum

Quite importantly, the course curriculum for civilian training needs to be approached from the perspective of an integrated mission which in the AU context refers essentially to the multi-dimensionality (civilian, police and military) of a mission as well as the coordination and cooperation that exists between these components and the overall multi-dimensional mission management and support structures. All civilian personnel working within the mission will need to have a good working level understanding of the integrated mission concept in both the AU and UN contexts. Integrated training should also very importantly target those at senior leadership level and for persons that will work closely together at both the HQ and sector level on key aspects such as assessments, planning, coordination, management and evaluation.

Thus a module on integrated missions should be incorporated into the various training courses with the aim of fostering general awareness of the concept (i.e. the intent and objectives thereof) versus its structures and mechanisms which may differ from mission to mission. Such awareness on the integrated mission concept should serve in the overall to inform the ethos and attitudes of personnel and should inform their daily work. Training on integrated missions can be delivered at all levels and in all types of training.

Two possible options for integrated training are:

- The military, police and civilian components can participate in a fully integrated course where they are learning together

consistently for a one to two week period, e.g. in a staff officers, integrated planning or civil-military coordination courses, or;

- The military, police and civilian components have their own specialised training courses parallel to each other over the same time period, but come together for specifically selected modules, e.g. civil military coordination, conceptual frameworks, integrated missions, or conflict management. In this example a regional PSO training centre would conduct a military staff officers course, an AU police officers course and a civilian mission preparedness course alongside each other at the same venue, or in the same vicinity, and bring the three groups together for integrated sessions on the topics mentioned, as well as for an overall integrated exercise.

Some Opportunities for integrated training include:

- The AU Senior Management Level Training

The AU Senior Mission Leaders Course (AU SMLC) is a good example of a fully integrated course which targets those (military, police and civilian) at the senior management level. This course, though consistent with UN doctrine and practise, is very much tailored to the African context and accordingly, it makes good use of African structures, approaches, case studies, facilitators etc.

The curriculum at this level of training may include such modules as: Conflict analysis; ASF vision/concept; strategic leadership; resource management; partnerships and UN support; planning; and gender for senior leaders.

Continuing challenges at this level will remain how to ensure appropriately qualified participants are nominated/selected for the course and how to improve the AUC/REC/RMs/Member State coordination so as to ensure amongst other things, timely response to requests for nominations.

- ASF and Regional Brigade Training Exercises

There are also a number of ASF training exercises that have been charted by the RECs/Regions, Brigades, PLANELMs and Centres of Excellence, some jointly with external partners. The relevant civilian training service providers should participate in exercises including via assisting in the exercise planning process; assisting as monitors, observers, resource persons etc. and participating in post scenario evaluations. One of the key benefits of participating in such exercises will be that the lessons learned and other observations deduced can be used to further inform an institutions training.

- Civilian Training Courses

Specific training courses aimed at the civilian components of AU and REC/RM PSOs will prepare civilians to serve in AU PSOs alongside their military and police counterparts. The course curriculum should incorporate a selection of the modules listed below. This is not an exhaustive list but a representation of some of the minimum modules that should be contained in a curriculum and which should always be informed by the realities on the ground and the needs of the ASF:

- Conceptual frameworks: Introduction to Conflict Prevention, Peacemaking, Peacekeeping and Peace building;

- Institutional Frameworks: the AU, UN, sub-regional organisations;

- Multidimensional Peace Operations including core functional areas

- The role of the military, police, civilian

- Civil-Military Co-ordination;

- Cultural Awareness and cross cultural communication

- Mental Preparation and Stress management

- Human Rights

- International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law

- Humanitarian Assistance

- DDR

- Security Sector Reform

- Gender Perspectives

- Protection of Vulnerable Groups

- Sexual Exploitation and Abuse

- HIV/AIDS

- Media Relations

- Conflict Management including Conflict Analysis, Negotiation, Mediation and Facilitation

- Working with interpreters

- The above may also be complemented by modules on practical aspects such as:

- Map reading

- Radio communications

- Road safety

- Mine Awareness

- Personal safety, hostage taking and crisis management

These practical types of modules can be supported by military and/or police training institutions that typically have the field exercise terrain and equipment necessary for this type of practical training, and provide further opportunities for civil-military cooperation.

6. Course Methodology

The course methodologies employed will differ from institution to institution based on factors pertaining to available resources and capacity. A general note of guidance however should be that institutions should strive to ensure a methodology that fosters an adult learning type or participatory learning approach. A good range of didactical techniques should be employed as and where relevant including substantive presentations, discussions, case studies, group work and various audio-visual aids. Trainings can also incorporate a mix of facilitators with academic and practical experience (so as to inform on best practice); high level/high profile facilitators (SRCCs, Force Commanders or Commissioners of Police, Ambassadors); and panel discussions highlighting both divergent and complementary views and approaches.

7. Standards

The AU, together with its training partners, should develop minimum standards for civilian training. ASF training policy states that training should be designed and conducted with due consideration of ASF Doctrine, AU guidelines, UN Standard Generic Training Modules (SGTMs) and any other relevant AU and UN documentation and it should also take into account actual events and developments at the regional and global level.[15] Training standards for the ASF should be in line with UN standards, where they exist.

Course curriculum and the methodologies employed by individual institutions can serve also to set the yardstick for minimum standards for ASF training. Those institutions that do not meet minimum standards should not be sidelined but should receive support to enable them to meet those standards.

Ultimately, when it comes to training for civilians of the ASF, the AU should aim at the realization of a system of civilian peacekeeping that is professional, efficient and available on demand. Once the AU has completed the identification, recruitment and rostering aspects as pertaining to civilian specialists for PSOs,

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[15] See report of ASF Training and Support and Coordination Workshop, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 24 – 26 April 2007

preparation of these individuals becomes another critical link that will facilitate their overall operational capability. Training should not only be limited to civilians that the AU intend to deploy but should also target those at the AUC and various REC/RM levels, those working in peacekeeping and peacebuilding related fields, and persons coming from national foreign ministries.

8. Key Issues Emerging from Plenary Discussion:

The Workshop was tasked in the overall to discuss the various aspects related to ensuring a more systematic and long-term preparation of civilian personnel for the ASF. An important priority will be to ensure that training for civilian personnel is integrated into efforts that have already been undertaken to ensure the readiness of military and police personnel. In addition to a presentation on an overview of the various training options, the AU PSOD delivered a presentation on the ASF training plan and the (APSTA) presidency briefed the Workshop on the ASF-APSTA relationship.   The key discussion areas are highlighted below:

o   Training for all civilian personnel of the ASF should be a mandatory requirement prior to deployment. The achievement of this will be challenging particularly because the core civilian staff for the ASF will be contributed not from within the RECs/RMs and AUC staff compliment but from contributions from a number of sources (as highlighted above) including the member states, civil society organizations, the private sector etc. Organising training for these persons will require greater coordination and cooperation from the diverse body of training service providers on the continent;

o   Civilian training service providers should strive to provide training that meets the minimum standards of training as set out in the ASF training policy (which in turn is designed to be consistent with UN policy). It was shared that amongst the regional training partners, there was a critical need to develop and agree upon the modalities for streamlining the curriculum and methodology for civilian training;

o   In addition to the function specific modules indicated in the background paper, participants also stressed the importance of the inclusion of modules such as *basic communication skills, safety and first aid, personal and physical security, mine awareness, cultural communication, driving and road safety,* and *map reading.* The emphasis on these types of modules serves to reinforce the fact that African civilians will be deployed in oftentimes hostile and hazardous environments and in this way, they would need to be physically and mentally prepared for the related challenges. Other types of modules to include would be *information management, reporting and conflict management* and particularly at the Senior Mission Leadership level, training should focus on *assessment, planning and coordination;*

o   It was strongly recommended that the training methodology should, where appropriate, and in addition to a classroom component, include practical field and simulation training. Thus participation of civilians in Levels I, II and III Decision Making Exercises (MAPEX, CPX and FTX) would be key. There should also be an emphasis on *problem-based learning* which allows for participants to identify and discuss a particular issue and come up with solutions thereto;

o   Training should consist of both integrated and single component training;

o   Facilitator exchange should be encouraged both amongst regional training partner institutions and regional and international partner institutions so as to allow for exchange of experiences and broadening of perspectives;

o   The regional training centres of excellence and other civil society organizations that provide training for civilians should (through the APSTA

framework) continue to cooperate closely not only amongst each other but also with the international civilian training partners[16]; and

o   Obtaining an appropriate profile for course participants was identified as a challenge, the overcoming of which requires more clearly defined selection criteria and more discerning screening of profiles. In order to avoid the current situation in which the same individuals are repeating courses at different institutions, the regional training partners will have to work closely on devising suitable and ethical methods for sharing details on persons who they have trained respectively.

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[16] For example Centre for International Peace Operations (Zif), Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution (ASPR), Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA), and Swedish Armed Forces International Centre (SWEDINT)

V. Conclusion

The Workshop had as its main objectives, determining the type of civilian staff that would be required for the ASF, recruitment options, possibilities for the establishment of a rostering system, and the type of readiness training that would be required in order to ensure a professional and readily available civilian cadre of personnel for African PSO missions. In this way it can be said that further strides were made to the ends of effecting a more systematic, thorough and coherent approach to the operationalisation of the civilian dimension of the ASF.

The Workshop provided a forum in which the AU, RECs/RMs could discuss and share ideas on these aspects both amongst each other and with the various other stakeholders and partners involved and/or interested in the area of civilian capacity building. It also served to create greater awareness and understanding of the civilian dimension of PSOs – an area that is relatively speaking still grey considering the decades long dominance of the military in the peacekeeping domain.

As follow-on actions, the following recommendations (to be undertaken in the immediate short-term) were put forth by the Workshop:

- o Both the AUC and the RECs/RMs should work jointly on developing job descriptions for the 60+ functions (that have been agreed upon) as well as developing the recruitment process for these positions;

- o AU and RECs/RMs should develop human resources policies for PSOs that address the particular needs of mission staff;

- o The RECs/RMs should start with the identification and recruitment for the 60+ positions (which translate into between 300 and 400 for the roster);

- o An AUC/REC/RM task team should be established to design an ASF roster based on the discussions of this Workshop; and

- o Funding will be critical to ensuring operationalization. Consequently, AUC and RECs/RMs together with international partners should identify adequate funding channels.

VI. Annexes

ANNEX 1: WORKSHOP AGENDA

AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE (ASF) CIVILIAN STAFFING, ROSTERING AND TRAINING WORKSHOP

<u>**AGENDA**</u>

Day 1: Wednesday, 9 July 2008

PM   Arrival of Delegates and Registration

Day 2: Thursday, 10 July 2008

Session I: Opening Session

08:30 – 10:00 *Opening Session*

- Welcome and opening of the Workshop– Bereng Mtimkulu, Head of AU PSOD
- Introduction of participants (self)
- Overview of ASF and role of civilian dimension – Bereng Mtimkulu
- Workshop goals & objectives – Cedric de Coning, ACCORD
- Group photograph

10:00-10:30 *Coffee & Tea Break*

Session II: Staffing & Recruitment

10:30-11:10 *Introduction: Civilian Staffing*

- Overview of civilian dimension Policy Framework and Staffing Options - Cedric de Coning, ACCORD

11:10-12:30 *Group Work: Civilian Staffing*

- Consider and recommend civilian staffing (functions & priorities)

12:30-13:30 *Lunch Break*

12:30-14:30   *Group Work: Civilian Staffing (continuation)*

14:30-17:30   *Plenary Feedback & Discussion: Civilian Staffing (including Coffee & Tea Break 15:30-16:00)*

19:30-21:30   *Welcome Reception*

Day 3: Friday, 11 July 2008

08:30-09:20   *Introduction: Recruitment*

- Overview of Recruitment Options – Cedric de Coning, ACCORD
- Overview of recruitment options
  - AU Current practise - Gaone Masire AU
  - UN Best Practise Andrzej Grzelka, DPKO AUPST

09:20-11:00   *Group Work: Recruitment (including Coffee & Tea Break 10:00-10:30)*

- Consider and recommend recruitment options

11:00-12:00   *Plenary Feedback & Discussion: Recruitment*

1200-12:30   *Wrap-up: Civilian Staffing & Recruitment*

12:30-13:30   *Lunch Break*

Session III: Rostering

13:30-14:30   *Introduction: Standby Rosters*
- Overview of Standby Roster Options – Nhlanhla Dube, AFDEM
- CMD Civilian Database, Abraham Kebede, AU
- International Best Practise – Winrich Kuehne, ZIF

14:30-17:00   *Group Work: Standby Rosters (including Coffee & Tea Break 15:30-16:00)*

17:00-18:00   *Plenary Feedback & Discussion: Standby Rosters*

18:00-18:30   *Wrap-up: Standby Rosters*

Day 4: Saturday, 12 July 2008

Session IV: Training

08:00-08:40   *Introduction: Training*
- Overview of Training Options – Yvonne Kasumba, ACCORD
- AU PSOD Training Plan – Charles Debrah, AU PSOD
- APSTA-ASF Relationship – Istifanus S. Zabadi, APSTA

08:40-10:00   *Group Work: Training*

10:00-10:20   Coffee & Tea Break

10:20-11:00   *Plenary Feedback & Discussion: Training*

Session V: Closing Session

11:00-12:00   *Closing Session*

- Summary and wrap-up of Workshop Outcome – Cedric de Coning, ACCORD
- Closing Remarks – Charles Debrah, AU PSOD

12:00 - 12:45 *Lunch*

Annex 2: LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

NAME	POSITION/INSTITUTION
Mr. Bereng Mtimkulu	*Head* African Union (AU) Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD)
Col Charles Debrah	*Training Officer* AU PSOD Department of Peace and Security
Ms. Macrine Mayanja	*Acting Head of Humanitarian Affairs, Refugees & Displaced persons Divisions* AU Commission
Ms. Martha Kabede	AU PSOD
Col Paul Elton Nzaou	AU PSOD
Mr. Chege Gatogo	AU
Mr. Crowd Chirenje	AU

Dr. Aderemi Adekoya	AU
Mr. Abraham Kebede	*AU/Database Administrator* Peace and Security Department
Ms. Gaone Masire	AU
Ms. Biscut Tessema	*Coordinator, PSD Finance Unit* AU
Mr. James Machakaire	SADC
Brig Gen Lancaster Bottoman	*Chief of Staff* SADCBRIG PLANELM
Mrs. Sylvia Mapolelo	*Human Resources* SADC
Cmmr. Joseph Ekandjo	*Director, Police PLANELM* SADC
Col Muzungu Munyaneza	*Chief of Staff* Eastern African Standby Brigade (EASBRIG) PLANELM

Cmmr. Kenneth O. Okal	*Assistant Commissioner of Police* EASBRIG
Ms. Amanda Magambo	*Civilian Planner* EASBRIG
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Mr. Etienne Ntankirutimana	*ECCAS*
Mr. Athanase Nthanga Oyougou	ECCAS

Col Jean Louis Epele	Republic of Congo
Mr. Jean Paul Mfinda	ECCAS
Col Jean Ekoua	ECCAS
Maj. Khaledi Al-Hassary	North Africa Region Capability (NARC)
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Mr. Oyo-Nyeko Benson	Assistant Commissionner of Police- Uganda Police
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