Globalisation and human rights in Africa
5th African Conference of Commandants
ACoC Conference Report

Report by Johan Potgieter, Sandra Adong Oder and Irene Ndungu
28–30 November 2011, Gaborone, Botswana
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## Abbreviations and acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACoC</td>
<td>African Conference of Commandants</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFRICOM</td>
<td>Africa Command</td>
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<td>APSTA</td>
<td>African Peace Support Trainers’ Association</td>
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<td>ASF</td>
<td>African Standby Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>AUC</td>
<td>African Union Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>BDCSC</td>
<td>Botswana Defence Command and Staff College</td>
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<tr>
<td>BPSTSA</td>
<td>British Peace Support Team to South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civilian–military cooperation</td>
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<td>CJAX</td>
<td>Combined Joint African Exercise</td>
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<tr>
<td>CoC</td>
<td>Conference of Commandants</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSG</td>
<td>Civilian Stabilisation Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil society organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>DS</td>
<td>Directing staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>EASF</td>
<td>Eastern Africa Standby Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>EASFCOM</td>
<td>Eastern Africa Standby Force Coordination Mechanism</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAFCSC</td>
<td>Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College</td>
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<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISS</td>
<td>Institute for Security Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of understanding</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSSG</td>
<td>Military Stabilisation Support Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDC</td>
<td>NATO Defence College</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLANELM</td>
<td>Planning Element</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSOD</td>
<td>Peace Support Operations Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSO</td>
<td>Peace support operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REC</td>
<td>Regional economic community</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SANWC</td>
<td>South African National War College</td>
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<tr>
<td>STCDSS</td>
<td>Specialised Technical Committee on Defence, Safety and Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>SU</td>
<td>Stabilisation Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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Executive summary

The African Conference of Commandants (ACoC) is committed to contributing to African security through the development and transformation of the education and training of the military in support of multidimensional peace support operations (PSOs), and to improving coordination among African Staff Colleges in order to contribute towards promoting cooperation and standardisation among them as a contribution to the African Standby Force (ASF) and PSOs.

ACoC held a three-day conference on ‘Globalisation and human rights in Africa’. This conference took place at the Southern Sun Hotel, Gaborone, Botswana from 28–30 November 2011.

Conference goal
The goal of the conference was to acknowledge and deliberate on the need for an effective and coherent approach in dealing with peace and security in a globalised world.

Objectives of the conference
- The conference aimed to:
  - Deliberate on the importance of having a harmonised training syllabus among all Staff Colleges for the common understanding of military concepts in a globalising world
  - Share experiences and best practice that Staff Colleges should take into consideration and model according to their own unique environments
  - Propose initiatives to enhance ACoC’s effectiveness on the continent

Forty-nine delegates, including facilitators and rapporteurs, attended the conference, and were provided with thought-provoking presentations on the impact of globalisation on human rights in Africa and the role of Staff Colleges in promoting gender equality in the military, among others.

Delegates acknowledged that notwithstanding financial strain, implementation of the decisions taken at previous conferences was an ongoing process, with substantial progress having been made in terms of the agreed result areas. They also noted that the current vision and mandate of ACoC should not be limited to peacekeeping operations alone, but should also include the overall professional development of a military officer who has all-round skills, is knowledgeable in the dynamics of the continent and the world, and is able to operate with other militaries in a multinational environment.

This conference was a step forward for ACoC in its mission to develop professional officers, and delegates agreed that while it was the role of armed forces to defend countries, it was the role of Command and Staff Colleges to prepare succeeding generations of officers for the military profession, in cognisance of the changing security environment in a globalised world.
The African Conference of Commandants (ACoC) is an annual gathering of commandants that meets to discuss military education and related issues. To this end, the conference aims to enhance cooperation and standardisation among African Command and Staff Colleges as a contribution to the African Standby Force (ASF) and peace support operations (PSOs).

The 5th ACoC was held in Gaborone, Botswana from 28–30 November 2011 under the chairmanship of Brigadier General Gotsileene Morake, commandant of the Botswana Defence Command and Staff College. The following commandants, deputy commandants and representatives also attended the conference:

- Major General Mahmoud Mohamed Ahmed Khalifa, commandant, Egyptian Command and Staff College
- Major General Kwesi Yankson, commandant, Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College
- Major General Jackson Waweru, commandant, Kenya Defence Staff College
- Rear Admiral Gabriel Edmund Okoi, deputy commandant, Nigeria Armed Forces Command and Staff College
- Rear Admiral PT Duze, commandant, South African National War College
- Brigadier Kamal Eldin Hamad Elnil, representing the commandant, Sudanese Joint Staff Services Command and Staff College
- Brigadier General Ali Altefe, commandant, Libya Command and Staff College
- Brigadier General Rick RK Chimowa, commandant, Malawi Staff College
- Brigadier General Frederick Siluzungila, commandant, Namibia Military School
- Brigadier General Apollo Kasita-Gowa, deputy commandant, Botswana Defence Command and Staff College
- Brigadier General Henry Nyundu, commandant, Zambian Defence Services Command and Staff College
- Brigadier General Augustine Chipwere, commandant, Zimbabwe Staff College
- Colonel Twagirayezu Callixte, commandant, Burundi Higher Military Training Centre

Thirty-five observers from Staff Colleges, civil society, and regional and international organisations also attended the conference.

The conference, whose theme was ‘Globalisation and human rights in Africa’, focused on:

- Reviewing the 4th ACoC and implications for ACoC’s future
- Presentations by Staff Colleges on ‘Globalisation and human rights in Africa’ and implications for ACoC
- Lessons learned and implications for ACoC
- Consideration of the strategic direction of ACoC.
Day One – Session I

Official opening of the 5th ACoC

Welcome and opening remarks

Brig. Apollo Kasiita-Gowa
Brig Gotsileene Morake
Brig. Gotsileene Morake welcomed all delegates to the 5th ACoC and expressed his delight at the hosting of the conference. He commended the noble pursuit of the organisation and called for more concerted efforts aimed at strengthening and consolidating the progress achieved so far.

The business of ACoC started in 2007 with a small number of participants, but with the hope that this number will increase, and it can only get bigger. But growth in size will also result from how various nations and, indeed, militaries perceive the essence of this organisation.

ACoC provides the commandants of the senior military colleges in their respective countries an opportunity to share their experiences of the military profession and ultimately try and adopt those that may be relevant to respective situations into respective training syllabi. Indeed, all colleges take into consideration their peculiar environments and model their training to suit that environment. In Africa, there are a lot of similarities in character, culture, socio-economic structures and, indeed, problems. For these reasons, it is possible that different armed forces will be required to operate in the same theatre to solve a common African problem. There are multinational African forces operating in the Sudan and Somalia forces comprising contingents from Uganda, Burundi, Kenya and Ethiopia. Much as the problems may be common, training is not always similar and could create problems in military communication.

The ACoC fora therefore will help to harmonise training syllabi so that in military operations, officers will have a common understanding of military concepts. Regarding ACoC’s aspirations, there is a need for members to take stock of what they wish to do with the organisation. If the role of the armed forces is to defend countries, it is the role of Command and Staff Colleges to prepare succeeding generations of officers to achieve this goal. ACoC aspires to forge a common ground of education for officers and most especially in, but not limited to, peacekeeping and disaster mitigation. The need for the militaries of the world to operate together is more important now than ever before. Since ACoC last met, a number of things have happened, especially in North Africa. In some cases, the question will be asked, where was the African solution? ACoC therefore has a role to play because as we train officers in the skills of military operations, we also train them to be mindful of the populations that they seek to protect.

The implementation plan of the 4th ACoC, to use the words of Maj. Gen. Yankson, was quite ambitious. In the 4th ACoC it was agreed that a logo for ACoC should be adopted, as well as to initiate a memorandum of understanding (MoU) or charter binding the members of ACoC to the organisation, seek an MoU with the African Union (AU), popularise the aspirations of ACoC, propose the
establishment of an African Command and Staff College to the AU, and source funding for ACoC from the AU and other willing partners. The ACoC Secretariat will go into detail later on the results of some of these issues, but suffice to note that ACoC was tabled at the AU and Gen. Maj. Gutti, supported by Maj. Gen. Yankson, addressed the AU Chiefs of Defence on ACoC.

There were mixed reactions, with some quarters feeling that ACoC was duplicating the work of the African Peace Support Trainers’ Association (APSTA), and since APSTA was already in existence, it was not necessary to have ACoC. It was, however, clarified that ACoC, unlike APSTA, is not limited to peacekeeping operations alone, but looks to turn out a professional military officer with all-round skills, knowledgeable in the dynamics of the world and able to operate with other militaries in a multinational environment. The existence of ACoC was noted, as was the view that further discussions needed to be held to concretise ACoC as an entity within the AU. Maj. Gen. Yankson’s support in this venture was greatly appreciated. This is unfinished business and it is hoped that the Secretariat will continue to coordinate to ensure that ACoC is again tabled at the next AU Chiefs of Defence and Council of Ministers meetings.

On popularising ACoC among regional economic communities (RECs), Maj. Gen. Gutti was able to visit the Southern African Development Community (SADC) headquarters, where he was warmly received and exchanged views with members, while Brig. Gowa was able to represent the Chair on a visit to the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade HQ in Nairobi, where he too was very warmly received. At both places ACoC’s aspirations were spelt out and support was expressed. There is work still to be done – it was not possible to visit the Economic Community of Central African States, or North African states and the East African Community, and it is hoped that the incoming chair will continue with this task.

The logo and MoU were sent to members via electronic mail from the Chair and a few members responded. Up till now, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) has been our Secretariat, a role it has so commendably fulfilled. Through it, ACoC has been able to communicate and finally get together. It is hoped that it will continue to be our Secretariat, a decision that this conference will have to decide on. However, for the ISS to do this job of coordination, it is necessary that some funding be made available to it for various activities, including hosting the ACoC portal.

ACoC has been fortunate that the British government was able to give some assistance and, indeed, a good part of this helped the Chair to travel to the earlier mentioned meetings and some has been used to organise the present meeting. However, this assistance is due to stop and ACoC needs to carry its own mantle. Appreciation is extended to the British government for the assistance given. The issue of funding and donor support is an item tabled for further discussion, where member colleges need to consider making contributions to cover ACoC costs. The MoU, once agreed upon, should be able to provide guidance.

In conclusion, Brig. Gowa expressed the outgoing Chair’s appreciation for the support rendered to him during his tenure of office and humbly requested that the same be extended to the incoming Chair of the 5th ACoC. He noted that the attendance of those present was testament to their desire to see ACoC grow, in spite of all that was happening on the continent, and expressed his hope that such meetings would help to forge greater achievements in later years.
Day one – Session II

Review of the 4th ACoC and implications for ACoC’s future

SADC combined joint African exercise: lessons learned

Col Sean Stratford
on behalf of
Rear Admiral PT Duze

The Chairperson’s report was presented on behalf of the Chair by Ms Sandra Adong Oder from ACoC secretariat. Johan Potgieter, Executive Secretary, ACoC Secretariat, also presented on the issues of the memorandum of understanding, logo, funding and other matters. These presentations are captured in the minutes of the conference.

Also, during this session, Colonel Sean Stratford, chief instructor at the South African National War College (SANWC), presented an update on the lessons learned from the SADC Combined Joint African Exercise.
The concept of SADC CJAX emerged at the First ACoC in November 2007. It is modelled on the Combined Joint European Exercise concept, which is directed by the NATO CoC. Similarly, ACoC directs CJAX. The South African National War College (SANWC) volunteered to run the 2010 pilot CJAX on behalf of SADC and ACoC. To facilitate this, the SANWC also ran the SADC CJAX working groups.

The aim of CJAX is to train at the operational level in Joint, Multinational and Interagency environment in order to promote synergy between SADC Command and Staff Colleges, and develop a better understanding of the challenges involved in planning and coordinating a complex, multinational PSO.

**Specific objectives of the CJAX are to:**

- Enhance student knowledge on the full range of combined and joint operations planning
- Practise operational-level planning using the applicable AU and SADC doctrines
- Improve students’ ability and working skills in an interagency and international environment (since most students are not exposed to NGOs, this needs to be enhanced)
- Address developments in the African Security and Defence Policy
- Identify some contradictions in the process, e.g. while Staff Colleges may use their own planning tools, the use of the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) is desirable

Participants of the 2010 SADC CJAX were from South Africa, Botswana, Zambia, Namibia (observer status) and observers. CJAX 2011 was a classroom-based exercise that ran concurrently in the three host countries.

It presented senior military learners with planning a complex PSO in a national country that is troubled by civil and humanitarian strife. It developed wider knowledge of the challenges facing military personnel working with civilian agencies and police personnel. Members of the SANWC, the BDCSC, the Namibia Military School and the Zambian Defence Services took part.

Some of the achievements were the exchange of participants, which was a positive experience, while the exchange of experiences was a force multiplier. Input from civilians added greatly to the exercise's success, but there is still room for improvement. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the International Committee of the Red Cross attended the exercise, as did police and correctional services. Attracting civilians should be a lot easier as they also benefit from the experience.

**CJAX 2011 had 2 phases:**

- **A preparation phase:** This comprised an academic foundation similar in all colleges, a Train the Trainer (T3) seminar for DS, and two planning sessions (the main and final planning conferences, as well as the T3 combined)
- **Exercise UHURU:** This comprised a PSO planning exercise concurrently executed in all colleges, including an exchange of four students and one DS member among all participating colleges. Additionally for 2011, a Namibian delegation (three participants and one DS member) participated in each CJAX with a view to potentially running its own in due course.

The official handing over of the chairmanship from South Africa to Zambia was done on 28 November 2011.
during the 5th ACoC. The Zambian Command and Staff College is now the co-ordinating authority for CJAX 2012. Proposed dates for the 2012 exercise are:

- Main planning conference 1: 09–12 April 2012.
- Final planning conference 2: 25–29 June 2012
- Exercise UHURU: 03–07 September 2012

In summary, CJAX 2011 was a huge success, but could be more productive in 2012 and more civilians should be involved. CJAX offered participants the opportunity to:

- Overcome generic challenges
- Understand each other’s doctrine
- Increase cultural awareness
- Increase cross-pollination of experiences
- Increase SADC inter-operability

This is the second time that this exercise has been run and is now firmly established as an annual event. Forging common understanding and mutual processes is key to the exercise, with the added benefit of sharing best practise.
Day Two – Session III

Setting the scene for the 5th ACoC

Keynote address:
Globalisation and human rights in Africa: a dialogue
Prof. David Abdulai, Executive Director

Proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Africa: the role of the military in combating the threat: the case of the ECOWAS sub-region
Maj. Gen. Kwesi Yankson

What is the impact of foreign nations’ involvement in Africa in peace and security on the continent?
Maj. Gen. Mahmoud Mohamed Ahmed Khalifa

Institutional security transformation in post-Cold War East Africa
Maj. Gen. Jackson Waweru, Commandant
The main challenge confronting Africa is development. But without peace and stability, Africa’s quest for development will be a pipe dream. Globalisation and human rights are totally different in meaning and context, but one cannot globalise without affecting humans rights. Therein lies the challenge. For example, George Orwell in his book 1984 talked about how ‘Big Brother is watching’, of how privacy is lost.

In our globalised world of today, numerous satellites are watching our every move. Daily, we leave our digital footprints behind in the electronic transactions we undertake, thereby giving other people more information about us and our lives. Today, sitting behind any computer anywhere in the world, you can use Google Earth to pinpoint with accuracy any location on earth. Then again, who is listening in on your mobile phone conversations? Think about it: who is intercepting your text messages or e-mails?

This picture painted is not fiction, but the fact of living in a globalised world today. This globalised world can be scary. Such intrusions into our private lives are tantamount to an invasion of our privacy and consequently a violation of our human rights.

So what are human rights and how is globalisation affecting them especially in Africa? Briefly, human rights are defined as those inalienable rights and fundamental freedoms that all human beings enjoy, regardless of their race, creed, colour, religion or sexual orientation. On 10 December 1948 the UN General Assembly adopted and proclaimed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Highlighting a few of them to drive home the idea of human rights is necessary.

Article 1 states, ‘All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. That are endowed with reason and conscience and we should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.’

Article 2 states, ‘Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.’

Article 3 states, ‘Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.’

Article 4 states, ‘No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.’

Article 5 states, ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment.’

In sum, human rights emanate from natural law; indeed, they define us as human beings.

Globalisation, according to Joseph Stiglitz, Nobel Laureate in Economics and author of Globalization and Its Discontents, ‘encompasses many things: the international flow of ideas and knowledge, the sharing of cultures, global civil society and the global environmental movement’. Others see globalisation as the closer economic integration of the countries of the world through the increased flow of goods and services, capital and labour. Generally, globalisation is regarded as the progress that brings our global village and its peoples together through travel, migration, war, trade, investment, cultural exchanges, information and communication technologies, and international organisations.

Since the inception of globalisation as we know it, it has always been the hope that it will bring about a rise in living standards around the world, by allowing poor countries to have access to the markets of developed countries, allowing foreign investors to invest in poor countries to produce products cheaply for global consumption, and allowing open borders for the free movement of goods and people.
It was also hoped that globalisation will allow foreign aid – with all its faults – to bring benefits to millions of poor. Indeed, the globalisation that has just been described has the potential to bring enormous benefits to humankind, particularly those who live in developing areas like Africa.

Unfortunately, globalisation has failed to live up to its potential and the expectations we have of it. It has created a wide divide between the haves and the have-nots and has left a lot of people, particularly those in the developing world, in poverty. It has also threatened the economic stability of some countries, specifically in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Poor countries have been pushed to eliminate trade barriers, but rich countries have kept theirs up through non-tariff barriers. They subsidise their farmers, but urge developing countries not to do the same. Through the strengthening of intellectual property rights, most Western drug companies are stopping drug companies in developing countries from manufacturing generic versions of life-saving drugs and thus making them affordable to the poor in developing countries. Thousands therefore are condemned to death because individuals and their respective governments cannot afford to pay for these drugs. These are just some few examples of the negative consequences of globalisation.

The problem is not with the ideal of what globalisation stands for, but the way in which it has been managed. Globalisation, more than ever, is driven by economics, not by politics or social issues. Hence, political and social aspects of globalisation have been thrown out of the window. The impact on political and social rights of people in developing countries – and this includes Africa – cannot be emphasised enough. But who are the culprits who have hijacked globalisation and are using it to satisfy their needs and agenda?

According to Stiglitz in his book, Making Globalization Work, the culprits that have changed the rules of the game and have set new rules are the advanced industrial countries, particularly special interest groups within those countries. According to Stiglitz, these special interest groups have not sought to create a fair set of rules that would promote the well-being of those in the poorest countries of the world. He argues that the current process of globalisation is generating unbalanced outcomes between and within countries. Furthermore, developing countries do not have a voice in shaping the process.

Here are some major concerns or discontents with globalisation, according to Stiglitz:

- The rules of the game that govern globalisation are unfair; they are designed specifically to benefit developed countries

- Globalisation advances material values over other values, such as concern for the environment or for life itself

- The current way in which globalisation is managed has resulted in its taking away much of the sovereignty of developing countries, and this affects their ability to make decisions that enhance the well-being of their citizens, thus undermining democracy

- The economic system that has been forced upon developing countries is inappropriate and often grossly damaging.

What then is the impact of globalisation on human rights? Firstly, a globalisation that is forced down the throats of African countries and other developing countries, manifested in the form of some of the dubious aspects of economic globalisation, has an impact on security rights. This can take the form of people being massacred, tortured, raped or murdered in the fight for natural resources. Numerous wars have been fought in our day as developed countries, including some African countries, seek to secure their control of these natural resources.

Secondly, globalisation can have an impact on our right to liberty, i.e. our right to our beliefs; to express ourselves freely; and to freedom of association, assembly and movement. For example, economic globalisation insists on the free movement of goods, capital and services, but restricts the free movement of people. Developed countries come up with stringent and complicated visa procedures so that the majority of people in Africa and other developing countries do not qualify for visas allowing them to travel.

Thirdly, globalisation can have an impact on our political rights, i.e. our right to participate in politics through peaceful assembly, protesting, voting and serving in public office. We all know this too well in Africa today. In the continent, most of our people are engaged in a fight to win what I call ‘the politics of the belly’. How can the majority of Africans express their political rights when they live in abject poverty and cannot afford to feed themselves? How can you even talk about their political rights when they are denied their economic rights to live a decent life? How many Africans go out into the streets and shout for their political rights on empty stomachs?

Fourthly, globalisation can have an impact on our due-process rights, i.e. the right to protect ourselves against unwarranted jeopardy by the legal system. This includes imprisonment without trial, secret trials or exposure to excessive punishment. The imposition on developing countries and, indeed, on Africa of a leadership not of their choice through the concept of ‘regime change’ either covertly or overtly can impact on due process rights as dissenters and opposition to such puppet regimes can be
visited with unfair trials and imprisonment. The Mobutus of Africa are a testimony to this fact.

Fifthly, economic globalisation can have an impact on the equal rights guaranteed to all citizens in a country by law. But when the gap between the haves and have-nots is a yawning one, we then have first- and second-class citizens with unequal rights. This can be linked to the impact of globalisation on our economic and social rights, i.e. our protection against severe poverty and starvation. The Sowetos of Africa, the Diepsloots of Africa, the Khayelitshas of Africa, the Kiberas of Africa are a case in point.

Finally, globalisation can have an impact on the rights of minority groups living in a country. This is the right that protects them against discrimination, genocide and forced expulsion. We have seen the use of modern communication methods by some misguided leaders or majority groups in developing countries to abuse the rights of minorities. The example of Rwanda and the use of Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines, which contributed immensely to the genocide in that country, is another case in point.

Globalisation is here to stay and it would be foolhardy to think that anyone can go back on the process. The questions for us in Africa then are: what should we do to make sure that globalisation works for us? How can we manage globalisation to enhance our human and economic rights?

Firstly, Africa must unite, politically, economically and culturally. If Africa unites as a continent, it can face together all the adverse aspects of globalisation. On African unity, the late Ghanaian president, Kwame Nkrumah, once said, ‘I can see no security for African states unless African leaders like ourselves, have realized beyond all doubt that the salvation for Africa lies in unity ... for in unity lies strength, and as I see it, African states must unite or sell themselves to imperialist and colonialist exploiters for a mess of pottage, or disintegrate individually.’

Secondly, to make globalisation work for Africa, Africans must have effective governments, that uphold the rule of law, have strong and independent judicatures, are open and transparent, are accountable to their people, and are relentless in their combating of corruption. An effective government also encompasses an effective public sector and a vibrant private sector. But it also means that African governments should manage our meagre resources well and Africans should also learn to live within their means.

Thirdly, Africans must make their voices heard about the adverse impact that globalisation has on them at the numerous international fora they attend. At these fora, Americans speak for Americans, Europeans speak for Europeans, Asians speak for Asians, so who is going to speak for Africa but Africans? Hence, more than ever, Africans must work together to put their story on the right footing to be able to work with other developing countries to reform the international institutions that govern globalisation to make sure that it works for Africans. We cannot afford to sit on the fence and expect globalisation to work for us. We have to understand that we are responsible for our well-being 50 or so years after the independence of the first African country.

Fourthly, Africans should not accept the economic dictum of the Washington Consensus about free markets. Markets are not free and we know it. Markets cannot be relied upon to deliver on public goods like defence, for example. We also know that in some areas, according to economists, markets fail to exist. Also, for a variety of reasons, markets are not self regulating, as evidenced by the boom-and-bust circles they contain. So it is important that African leaders and their governments play an important role in the economic stability of their various countries. They cannot leave that to the markets.

Finally, Africans must get a grip on the degradation of our environment. We must realise that such degradation leads to poverty – and in turn poverty leads to environmental degradation, in a vicious and never-ending cycle. We must work together with the rest of the world on global environmental issues, especially global warming, as our continent will suffer the most from the fallout of global warming.

When all is said and done, only Africans know and can tell the impact of globalisation and human rights on them. After this conference on this theme, we should go back to our numerous countries and to our policymakers and tell them that in Africa, human rights are about Africa’s development. Human rights are about how each individual African on the continent can maximise his/her God-given potential to live a decent and respectful life. Is that too much to ask for? So enough – this minute! Our people are tired of NATO – ‘No Action, Talk Only’. Let’s get to work now that we understand the issues. This is because the threat to Africa’s liberty, according to Justice Louis Brandies, an American jurist, ‘lies not with the evil-minded ruler – for men born to freedom are quick to resist tyranny – rather it lies with men of zeal (like you and I), well-meaning, but lacking understanding’.
Proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Africa

The role of the military in combating the threat: the case of the ECOWAS sub-region

Maj. Gen. Kwesi Yankson
Commandant, Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College

The end of the Cold War set in motion the desire for Western-type democracy in Africa, which in this paper is referred to simply as ‘rule by the majority’. The prior bi-polar situation that existed in the Cold War era virtually made most African countries one-party states at independence. The post-Cold War era ended inter-state conflicts, but promoted intra-state conflicts and agitations. With the diverse and ethnically oriented nature of African states, a great threat is posed to Western-style democracy as parties that evolved in the post-Cold War period mostly reflected a tribal and ethnic character. This situation led to the abuse of minority rights and the virtual exclusion of minority ethnic groups from the process of governance.

In Africa, being in government is not always a call to serve, but an opportunity to better your lot. In the face of scarce resources, politics has become a platform for the sharing of national resources. In this process of sharing, discontent results and this manifests in several political groupings that often resort to armed rebellion and the resultant procurement of small arms and light weapons. In West Africa, full-scale conflicts in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau and minority militant activities in other countries in the sub-region created stocks of small arms and light weapons that pose a threat to democracy and human rights. Efforts that should be channelled into development programmes are diverted into resolving the threat posed by the proliferation of small arms. Human rights issues arise out of this problem in the attempt by governments to contain these armed threats. The emergence of irregular forces with easy access to small arms calls for the refocusing of military doctrine and conduct to stem this threat.

Small arms and light weapons proliferation has become a critical issue that has attracted the attention of the world at large, because a causal relationship has been established between the widespread proliferation of weapons and the abuse of basic human rights and security in various ways. Trafficking in illegal arms has become very lucrative, attractive and a dangerous game played by many parties in the West African sub-region. It has been estimated that over 600 million small arms and light weapons are in circulation around the world. Approximately 380 million of these weapons are believed to be in civilian hands. It is assumed that 100 million are found in Africa. Also, it is estimated that in West Africa alone 7–8 million pistols, rifles, and other small arms are in circulation; about the same number as the population of Benin. Statistics have shown that the five permanent members of the UN Security Council together accounted for 88 per cent of the world’s conventional arms exports. These exports have undoubtedly contributed to gross human rights abuses in Africa.

In West Africa, weapons were provided to Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy in defiance of
the UN-imposed arms embargo at the time. The continued supply of weapons and ammunition to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) sub-region has contributed immensely to conflicts in the sub-region. It is believed that diamond and gold dealers, drug traffickers, and arms merchants thrive in conditions of confusion and instability. It is also believed that there is a network of mercenaries from almost every country in the sub-region with connections throughout Africa and the world at large.

The excessive and uncontrolled accumulation of small arms has led to the emergence of groups of armed individuals operating across and beyond state borders. Some of these include rebel movements, private militias, terrorists, drug traffickers, arms dealers and so on. The experience in West Africa has shown that the proliferation of small arms was a catalyst for crises and armed violence that helped to destabilise governments and states in particular as a result of the activities of subversive governments, guerrilla campaigns, terrorism, drug trafficking, civil wars and attacks on fundamental human rights. Consequently, it has become vital for all West African states to curb the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. Some causes of the proliferation of small arms in West Africa and Africa in general include:

- Trafficking in, local manufacture of, and theft of weapons belonging to individuals or the authorities.
- Local arms production: Traditionally, local arms were used for hunting, traditional festivals and funerals. However, in modern times they are used to commit violent crimes such as armed robbery and murder. Local gunsmiths manufacture these arms at a relatively cheaper cost than imported conventional arms.
- Theft of arms: The theft of arms belonging to individuals or to the state has led to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in West Africa.
- The rise in crime and criminal activities: The steady rise in crime has also led to increased demand for powerful weapons.
- Conflicts between communities: Ethnic- and communal-centred conflicts often arise from disputes between groups, particularly in relation to land, inheritance or resource allocation.

The role of ECOWAS: In addition to treaties and protocols, ECOWAS heads of state and government on 31 October 1998 adopted a Moratorium and Code of Conduct on the Import, Export and Manufacture of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Africa, as well as the Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development in Africa. The ECOWAS Moratorium was the first political agreement on small arms and light weapons in the sub-region, and showed ECOWAS’s resolve to prevent violence and build peace in the sub-region. It thus responded to a wish to establish an atmosphere of trust that promotes security as a basis for lasting economic and social development. The ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Related Material succeeded the ECOWAS Moratorium of 1998. It reaffirmed the basic principles of the Moratorium, such as the establishment of national commissions and the harmonisation of laws.

There are numerous challenges confronting the fight to curb the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the West Africa sub-region. In Ghana, for instance, the inspector-general of police is responsible for providing the National Small Arms Commission with quarterly returns on the registration and licensing of firearms. For all intents and purposes, this has been difficult to achieve because local arms manufacturers are not licensed and registered and, most importantly, the arms trade is conducted by unauthorised persons, often in secrecy. No conscious effort has been made by any member state to regulate the activities of these gunsmiths; rather, if they are arrested they are frequently released without charge. In addition, the various national commissions on small arms are ill equipped and faced with serious financial and human resource constraints. Also, there is the problem of how to effectively stop the circulation and availability of small arms in member countries. This had made the work of the commissions very difficult, to the extent that some have tagged small arms commissions as ‘white elephants’.

There is no central coordination mechanism for member states to adopt a single effective solution to the problem. Despite the adoption of the ECOWAS Moratorium and its successor, the ECOWAS Convention, armed crime, violence and conflict still remain major problems across West Africa. The ECOWAS Convention appears to have remained only an expression of intent, even though a lot has been achieved. Also, convincing member states to adhere to the principles enshrined in the various protocols appears to be problematic. Harmonising the various protocols and national small arms legislation creates a huge problem for member states. This is where the initiative and ideals of ACoC on the standardisation and harmonisation of training and doctrine is paramount and must be embraced by all member states.

West African countries have porous borders with unregulated movements of people that facilitate the circulation of small arms and light weapons. This means that legislation and moratoriums will never work unless they are set in concrete and collective political will allows member states to speak with one voice. Networking and
collaboration between and among national security agencies will largely address this problem.

Addressing the challenges and the way forward: First and foremost, addressing the challenges of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons will require greater political will on the part of leaders in West Africa and beyond. Even though member states have adopted the ECOWAS Convention, its full implementation has been problematic. Adopting more stringent laws to regulate the production and usage of small arms will be useful. This includes the identification and regulation of the activities of local arms manufacturers. Directives which will ensure that those in possession of small arms and light weapons return them to the security agencies for monetary rewards should be welcomed and encouraged. Public education and awareness on the ECOWAS Convention must be trumpeted. Civil society organisations (CSOs) and NGOs must take the lead to organise consultative workshops and seminars for communities and all stakeholders to sensitise them on the proliferation and threat of small arms and light weapons. Security agencies also have a huge role to play in this regard. Arms embargoes, the marking of arms, recordkeeping, tracing and stockpile management can be adopted to halt the proliferation of arms. There is also a need for the strict enforcement of national legislation on small arms. There may be a need to change or modify the laws and regulations to suit new trends. In Ghana, for instance, the National Commission on Small Arms and Light Weapons Act regulates the proliferation of small arms. It is to be noted that most of the weapons in circulation are smuggled into the country. The harmonisation of ECOWAS security legislation and domestic laws is often hampered by the following:

- Conditions for the granting of the various authorisations to carry or trade in weapons differ from one country to another
- Over a third of West African states failed to respond to the harmonisation project
- There is a lack of national legislation.

Harmonisation can be done by eliminating contradictions among the different national laws of member states. A register can be created at the national and sub-regional levels for small arms proliferation. This register will contain details of the identity of weapons, including registration number, date of manufacture and terms of acquisition, which will allow weapons to be tracked when they circulate.

ECOWAS member states should establish national and sub-regional computerised registers and database of small arms and light weapons, as stated in the ECOWAS Convention. Member states must update national legislation to ensure that the provisions in the ECOWAS Convention are minimum standards for the control of small arms and light weapons and their ammunition.

The UN, through its various agencies, can offer more assistance to ECOWAS to develop military professionals and other security agencies to arrest the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the sub-region. The Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College (GAFCSC), the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre and other Staff Colleges in the sub-region are actively involved in tackling the proliferation of small arms and must continue to collaborate so that this proliferation can be brought under reasonable control. These institutions at any one time have officers from almost all member states undertaking a workshop or course related to small arms and light weapons.

In most of the cases, especially in Nigeria and Ghana, Staff Colleges devote four weeks each year to run multisectoral courses on security-related issues that seek to identify and prescribe solutions to the evolving proliferation of small arms within and beyond borders. At GAFCSC, for example, Defence Management, Conflict and Crisis Management and Integrated Peace Support Programmes take up 16 weeks of the 46-week senior course. During these programmes, technocrats, CSOs, NGOs and members of the security services join the military officer students to study and discuss issues related to peace and security. A similar course of study is replicated in the Staff College of Nigeria. Francophone member states of ECOWAS are heavily represented on the courses in Ghana and Nigeria.

These Staff Colleges need to be supported by ECOWAS to expand their facilities, and member states that are not yet beneficiaries of these modules should be sponsored to take advantage of the courses. The small arms problem is fuelled by lack of knowledge and communication, and it is hoped that joint training and the harmonisation of doctrine will be beneficial to the efforts of ECOWAS. Strengthening sub-regional cooperation in the defence and security sectors of member states would also be useful in combating the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. Appropriate training in investigative procedures, border control and law enforcement techniques is required to stop the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. Officers of member states who benefit from these courses of study at Staff Colleges stand to better understand the issues and would be in a position to proffer pragmatic measures to address the small arms problem in the sub-region.

There are well-developed and well-documented instruments that seek to control the manufacture, procurement and use of small arms and light weapons...
in West Africa, but lack of political will and clear laws at the national level hinder progress. With the rise in political activity and militancy in the sub-region, the sub-regional response to the small arms problem needs to be revised and a more empowered document elaborated as new realities have resurfaced. In addition, while various measures have been taken by law enforcement agencies and other security agencies to curb the menace, ECOWAS and other security institutions and agencies still need to play much more rigorous and vigorous roles to ensure that, even though the total elimination of the menace of small arms and light weapons proliferation could not be achieved, at least the magnitude of the problem could be minimised and reduced significantly. The inclusion of Staff Colleges and other military institutions with peace support- and security-related course modules will add more viable options to the various instruments relating to small arms.
What is the impact of foreign nations’ involvement in Africa on peace and security on the continent?

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Africa, a continent full of ancient secrets and wealth, was targeted because of its wealth by many foreign countries over the centuries. The effects of foreign intervention in Africa are not to solve political problems, but to extend them to include social, economic, security and military issues clearly affecting African peace and security. African countries are looking for ways to overcome foreign interventions in Africa, address the implications of their involvement and also avoid the causes that lead to foreign interference in African countries’ affairs, which pose a real threat to peace and security.

African countries have to participate in solving the continent’s problems, provide support to countries affected by interventions and strengthen their capabilities to resist foreign interference.

Foreign involvement has caused challenges such as political and border crises in Africa; has led to border conflicts between many countries of the continent, thus impacting on national security; and has resulted in civil wars in some countries and increasing cases of rebellion against the governments and demands for secession.

Resources such as oil are still the underlying cause of the conflicts on the continent, making oil-rich countries the site to achieve the ambitions of foreign countries. Africa has become a playground for the old colonial powers to invest in and exploit Africa’s resources as an unlimited market.

Foreign involvement has also had an economic impact in Africa, as well as on military and security on the continent.
Institutional security transformation in post-Cold War East Africa

Maj. Gen. Jackson Waweru, Commandant
Kenya Defence Staff College

‘The international order is notoriously lacking in mechanisms of peaceful change, notoriously dependent on war as the agent of change.’

Hedley Bull, Anarchical Society

‘Force is an ineluctable element in international relations not because of any inherent tendency on the part of man to use it but because the possibility of its uses exists. It has thus to be deterred, controlled and if all else fails used with discrimination and restraint.’

Michael Howard, War and Peace

The end of the Cold War in the 1990s was interpreted as a victory of the West/capitalism over the Eastern Bloc/communism. In Africa and particularly East Africa and the Horn of Africa, the end of the Cold War was interpreted on the basis of superpower rivalry. As Godfrey Okoth notes in his works, the end of the Cold War was a landmark in international relations – the end of intense ideological rivalry between the United States (US), the leader of world capitalism, and the Soviet Union, the leader of world socialism.1

Therefore, in the absence of the Soviet Union, the US emerged as the sole superpower, ushering in a new world order. In this regard, the consequences in the security of the human collectivities supersede the collective state security as informed by Realist Theory.

The security of humanity in the post-Cold War world is affected by a matrix of factors, as argued by various scholars and technocrats. Buzan identifies some of these factors as military, political, economic, social and environmental.2 It is important to point out at this juncture that the subsequent discussion on security in the East African Community (EAC) sub-region has to a large extent adopted Buzan’s approach to and perception of security issues:


Military security concerns the two level interplay of the armed offensive and defensive capabilities of states and states’ perceptions of each others’ intentions. Political security concerns organizational stability of states, systems of government and the ideologies that give them legitimacy. Economic security concerns access to the resources, finances and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power. Societal security concerns the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution of traditional patterns of language culture, religion, national identity and customs. Environmental security concerns the maintenance of the local regional and planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human enterprise depend.3
It is important to note that the factors discussed above are often interwoven and provide a useful framework for prioritising security issues to ensure effective and guaranteed state security. EAC sub-regional security issues require a radical paradigm shift from traditional methods, where the state and its agents were the main managers of security, to the adoption of a wider perspective of analysing sub-regional security. In this way, security issues and movements that individual member states are unable to control can be addressed. Thus, a wider-perspective approach/alternative paradigm can capture human security in all its dimensions and analyse non-military threats such as poverty, disease, environmental degradation, unemployment and bad governance.

The EAC emerged towards the end of the Cold War to address the emerging security situation in which the East Africa sub-region found itself. The end of the Cold War ushered a shift in the Western world’s interests and Africa’s geopolitical importance took a back seat. Consequently, Africa’s interests were sidelined in favour of those of Eastern Europe, where more Western resources were needed to consolidate the gains achieved by the triumph of capitalism over communism.

This is well illustrated in Kissinger’s persuasive argument that the paradox of Africa is that the challenge is vast, while concepts through which to craft any policy for overcoming it are elusive. Secondly, there is no overriding threat from outside the continent, nor is there a state in sub-Saharan Africa that is in a position to threaten others, with the exception of Nigeria and South Africa, which are in a position to play some role outside their immediate regions. Hence, African security issues – largely civil wars and ethnic conflicts – should be left to African nations. Thus, the emergence of sub-regional cooperation in Africa to foster economic development and political stability is a self-help mechanism to sustain African relevance in the post-Cold War globalised era.

The sub-regional cooperation objective is to exploit the advantages of inter-dependence and to maximise inter-state and intra-state interactions in trade, commerce and security matters. In addition, a collective regional approach strengthens the state’s capability and bargaining power, as opposed to the individual-state approach. In the East Africa sub-region the EAC was re-initiated by Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. In 2009 Rwanda and Burundi were brought on board. At the moment the new state of South Sudan has indicated its desire to join the EAC and probably in the near future it is likely to be the latest member. The focus on the EAC will centre on the mechanisms it has put in place to respond to various regional security issues.

The analysis of the EAC is conducted on the premise that each member state already has established and functional security organs and agencies. It is a known fact that each member state has a defence force, a police force, an intelligence service, and other security agencies to guarantee national security and survival. However, this is a traditional approach that is rooted in Realist Theory of the state as the major actor in international politics. But some scholars, like Oye, argue that there are a number of conditions and national strategies from non-state quarters that can make it easier for states to achieve common ends. The critical strategy in this category is cooperation among states, which is an easier alternative if there are only a few actors. In this case, each actor carefully observes the others, but all actors know that their impact on the sub-region is great enough so that if they fail to cooperate, their joint enterprises are likely to fail.

Another assumption of sub-regional cooperation is demonstrated in cases where states have long time horizons in which even successfully exploiting others produces an outcome that is only a little better than mutual cooperation, when being exploited by others is only slightly worse than mutual non-cooperation, and when mutual cooperation is much better than unrestricted competition. But for sub-regional cooperation to achieve benefits, viable institutions are important. As Keohane argues, institutions help states to work toward mutually desired outcomes by providing a framework for long-run agreements, making it easier for each state to see whether others are living up to their promises and increasing the costs a state will pay if it cheats.

Thus there is need to redefine sub-regional security away from the traditional preoccupation with state security in order to provide for the wider perspective of analysing sub-regional security from an enlarged angle that captures human security in all its dimensions, as earlier mentioned. This alternative paradigm covers non-military threats to security such as poverty, disease, environmental degradation, unemployment and bad governance.

Under Article 9 of the treaty that established the EAC, a number of institutions were inaugurated in order to further the functions of the sub-region. Among the institutions are the Council, the Sectional Committee, the East African Court of Justice, the East African Legislative Assembly and the Secretariat.

From the structure of the EAC organs, one can discern grey areas that need further attention. In Article 11(5) the Summit can delegate its functions subject to any conditions that it may deem fit to impose on a member state, the Council or the Secretariat. Automatically, this article is likely to generate
impediments, as it touches on state sovereignty. States are sovereign in their own right and may not be ready to allow any external interference in their domestic affairs. For instance, Uganda considers the Lord’s Resistance Army a domestic issue and so it may not allow other EAC states to interfere. Similarly, the Kenyan government considered the 2007/8 post-election violence an internal affair and was not ready to accept any external intervention. This demonstrates that there is a need to develop a broad-based security framework within the EAC with the capacity and capability for early intervention within partner states to stem any emerging threats to peace and security within the sub-region.

It is on record that the EAC has clear objectives to promote peace, security and stability within the sub-region and engender good neighbourliness among partner states. However, there is no framework to coordinate the security elements and therefore the security situation in the sub-region remains volatile, since there is no single existing organ mandated to intervene unilaterally within the sub-region. Even the Eastern Africa Standby Force has no mandate for unilateral intervention to maintain sub-regional peace and security whenever and wherever threats to stability emerge.

Other security issues impact negatively on the security situation in East Africa, and member states should develop an appropriate framework to address them. Firstly, there is the element of globalisation. Globalisation has ensured that there is an unlimited flow of ideas, information, goods, labour and communication across national borders with little regard for national sovereignty. EAC member states need to come up with a security framework to protect the region from the negative effects of globalisation.

Secondly, the growth in information technology and particularly in communication technology is a concern that EAC partner states may have to keenly watch. The impact of popular social media sites like Facebook and Twitter has been witnessed across North African states, with devastating consequences for state security. The revolutionary security situation in that sub-region, popularly referred to as the ‘Arab Spring’, demonstrates the effects of social media. In this regard, the EAC should have deliberate plans and structures in place to handle such eventualities. As argued elsewhere, Fantu asserts that globalisation has provided a coalescence of varied transitional processes and domestic cultures, allowing the economics, politics, culture and ideologies of states in a sub-region to penetrate other states.8

The other security concern is the status of the existing armies of EAC member states. These armed forces have received different levels of training and the element of professionalism varies from one partner state to another. Like many armies across Africa, there is the potential of military engagement in the local politics of their respective states. Such a situation creates a military dilemma whereby agents of security turn out to be definite threats to state security. This is a paradox, as Osgood points out: the primary instrument of order, i.e. the armed forces, is also the primary threat to security.9

This perspective underpins the widely held view that military power lies at the heart of the security problem.
The complexity of this scenario is what Buzan has called the ‘defence dilemma’, which arises primarily from the nature of military means as they are developed and deployed by states without losing sight of the dynamics of relations among states.\(^{10}\)

In the spirit of the planned EAC political confederation by 2015, it is prudent that member states come up with a suitable security framework and boost the economic, social and environmental security that are critical issues of the post-Cold War global system. The major concern here falls on the use of Lake Victoria and its associated resources. The lake serves almost all the EAC partner states. Its waters must be utilised to sustain environmental and economic development in the region. The recent pollution of the lake by industries and water hyacinths is suffocating the fishing industry of the lake and has reduced its water volume. This is a definite threat to security and, as Kahl argues, future insecurity and conflict in EAC would emanate from sponsored violence arising from competition to utilise Lake Victoria’s water and resources.\(^{11}\)

In view of the above, it is advisable that EAC member states develop stringent measures to safeguard Lake Victoria. Secondly, the Basin Development Authority should be enhanced to address serious pollution cases affecting the lake and this should involve all the member states that are served directly or indirectly by the lake. Another security issue is the Nile River waters. The member states of the EAC have denounced the colonial treaties of 1929 and 1959 that allocated most of the Nile waters to Egypt with little consideration for the wishes of other riparian states. Subsequently, this has created misunderstanding and discomfort in relations between Egypt and the other riparian states over the usage of the Nile waters. The other riparian states have come up with the Nile Basin Initiative, which advocates a new treaty to cover the Nile River and its hinterland water usage activities. While some riparian states have signed this initiative, Egypt has been very reluctant to sign, since it regards the waters of the Nile as its lifeblood. Any interference with the Nile River leaves all possible options open for Egypt, something that can negatively impact on EAC partner states’ security. In this regard, the EAC states need to develop a permanent and workable mechanism to address the Nile River security challenges. For this to work effectively, the efforts of the international community and friends of the EAC partner states are indispensable.

Finally, the current security issues that the sub-region is grappling with are piracy and terrorism. The piracy menace in the Indian Ocean has cost the region dearly in terms of resources and reputation. The mushrooming of piracy is closely associated with the failed state of Somalia and activities in Yemen and other Middle East countries. Tackling piracy should therefore be closely tied to the stabilisation of the Somali state. The deployment of AU forces in Somalia to support the Transition Federal Government is closely linked with the international efforts of the joint task force in the Indian Ocean headed by Canada to curb piracy.

Similarly, terrorist activities in East Africa have strong linkages with al-Qaeda, and since the American Embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998, a lot has
changed in this terror group. A remarkable development is that it has evolved degrees of command and control and there are said to be links between the core leadership and affiliates, largely in East Africa. Sub-regional terrorist cells are said to be well distributed across the region, but highly concentrated in the failed state of Somalia.

In conclusion, it is not sufficient to end this discussion without capturing the role and place of military colleges in the security debate. Firstly, it is proposed that as centres of excellence in security and defence studies, the respective colleges should bring on board useful courses in strategic studies to enrich the defence knowledge and decision-making process of future security commanders in the sub-region.

Secondly, existing colleges should encourage officer exchange programmes involving either students or DS. Such exchanges help to shape perceptions and downgrade aggressive decisions that are likely to destabilise the sub-region.

Other activities outside Staff Colleges like sub-regional military games and range competitions, as well as joint/combined exercises and operations, have their special place in improving the sub-regional security situation.

Since security is an expensive undertaking, it is only prudent if a joint-approach strategy for dealing with regional security matters is institutionalised and operationalised. The Rapid Deployment Force to monitor the regional security situation is critical and, if honestly applied, would greatly reduce the cost of dealing with sub-regional security matters.

NOTES

3 Ibid., 19–20.
6 Ibid., 6.
10 Buzan, People, states and fear, 272.
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**Lessons learned and implications for ACoC**

Globalisation and human rights in Africa: the role of Staff Colleges in promoting gender equality in the military

*Brig. Gen. Kestoria Kabia*

Lessons learned and best practice from the NATO CoC

*Brig. Gen. Gerd Bischof*

Stabilisation: a comprehensive approach

*Maj. JR Woodfine R Welsh*

Peace and security in Africa

*Brig. Gen. Arnold Gordon-Bray*
Globalisation and human rights in Africa

The role of Staff Colleges in promoting gender equality in the military

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The military is one of the most important organisations within any society. This is because it is one of the defenders of not only a country’s safety, but also its development and way of life. It is authorised to use lethal force, usually including the use of weapons, in defending its country by combating actual or perceived threats. Throughout history, the military also has had additional functions in terms of its greater society, such as advancing a political agenda (e.g. communism during the Cold War era), supporting or promoting economic expansion through imperialism, and as a form of internal social control. As an adjective, the term ‘military’ is also used to refer to any property or aspect of a military. Militaries often function as societies within societies by having their own communities, economies, education systems, medical services, judiciaries and other aspects of a functioning civilian society.

De facto discrimination against and harassment of women persist in almost all areas of our society, but there is one institution that officially restricts women from certain jobs, regardless of their merits; that institution is perhaps the most traditional and conservative organisation in our modern world, i.e. the military. Reforming this institutional discriminatory practice is not only a necessity for social justice but also the gateway to a more modern and professional military force. There is therefore the need to make use of the important tool of training/learning in the military to help with this most important task. The aim of this paper is therefore to highlight the way in which Staff Colleges can be used to promote gender equality within the military.

Masculinity plays an important role in any military. Military organisations create roles and responsibilities that they expect their members to adapt to and fulfil throughout their time of service. Military norms could be similar to societal norms, where certain individuals obtain specific titles that require them to adhere to well-defined behaviours. Just as it is used within society, masculinity is a word that is associated with the military quite often. Femininity also has its place within the military, just as it does in society. While explaining the importance of masculinity in the military, it is crucial to appreciate the importance of femininity, which runs hand-in-hand with masculinity. Just as it is important to recognise the significance of both gender roles, it is also imperative to understand that masculinity and femininity are gender roles and not sex roles.

When one thinks of the qualities an individual must possess to serve in the military, more often than not they are defined by masculinity. However, it is inaccurate to assume that women cannot possess the same qualities. Army values are characteristics that further define a soldier and the basic skills needed for working...
in the military, no matter what kind of work is done. The acronym LDRSHIP – Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honour, Integrity, and Personal Courage – defines traits that one should strive to possess. It is important that soldiers develop the mentality of not wanting to be told what to do out of their own heads, because it is unrealistic. No matter where one goes in life, someone will always be dictating what needs to be done. What matters or is considered important varies from culture to culture, and this implies the imperative for emotional self-control, which is pertinent to combat soldiers.

Military jobs require many different personalities and traits in their execution. Some jobs can be viewed by societal norms as more masculine, such as construction and engineering, while others are considered more feminine, such as counselling and providing health care. Along with enlisted job opportunities, there are also officer opportunities for managing and supervising for those that qualify. While the military claims to treat men and women equally, their inequality is revealed through masculinity and femininity.

The Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces offers about 20 per cent of its jobs to both men and women, with the remaining 80 per cent being combat roles offered only to men. The problem with this is that as a result, women still constitute a very small percentage of military personnel. The military within any country does indeed have a job to perform, although militaries are creating inequality by barring certain jobs from female applicants that would otherwise qualify. Along with this, militaries also collectively engage in the same practices as society by objectifying women, most often unintentionally.

The willingness to be killed for a country does not come natural for a man or a woman, yet more men are willing to make the sacrifice by unconsciously associating masculinity and aggressiveness with who they are. This idea is one possible reason why women are barred from some jobs and are far less incorporated within militaries. However, the irony of a situation like this is that when the rebel war was rife in Sierra Leone, it did not matter whether it was female or male personnel who were recruited to fight. Another potential reason for the lack of women within militaries is that women are creating inequality by barring certain jobs from female applicants that would otherwise qualify. Along with this, militaries also collectively engage in the same practices as society by objectifying women, most often unintentionally.

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There are many factors that contribute to the tradition of open discrimination against women in the military. Soldiering around the world is commonly a male-dominated profession that breeds an excessively masculine environment. In these circumstances, women have to learn to communicate in masculine ways in order to be effective. The nature of the profession demands that armies be aggressive, vigilant and unerring in their propensity to deliver lethal force against enemies. Traditional feminine qualities are seen as weak and equated with defeat on the battlefield. In addition to this, military society tends to be somewhat isolated from civil society, reducing scrutiny from subjects outside of the military order. The result is an environment that can be hostile to women and that responds slowly to pressure for reform.

As long as women are barred from any military job, there will be limited justice for them in the military. Currently, women are banned from officially serving in most combat positions, including infantry roles. In Sierra Leone, it was only during the 11-year civil war that women were conscripted in the war zone by officers who were desperate to get manpower by any means, and therefore women started doing infantry duties. The infantry soldier is the foundation of any army and ironically dubbed the ‘Queen of the Battlefield’. As long as this fundamental military profession excludes women, they will not have equal access to positions of leadership within the ranks that can bring about cultural change from within. Women are essentially restricted to supporting roles.

One of the most popular arguments against the full integration of women in the military is that women are somehow unfit for combat. This argument suggests that women cannot handle the emotional or physical demands of combat, and that men cannot bear to see women hurt on the battlefield. It often implies that male soldiers cannot be expected to behave professionally if women are introduced into their environment. The answer to this often-presented argument is that professionalism, respect for one another and teamwork are generally blind to gender differences and view everyone in the team as equal partners.

Our solution to this problem defines our understanding of gender equality. Our military represents our most traditional beliefs. Defending gender discrimination in our military is inevitably linked with beliefs about the limitations of women throughout our society. Thankfully, national armies in the transformation processes of most SADC countries have proved beyond reasonable doubt that this belief can no longer hold true.

Military Staff Colleges train military officers in the administrative, staff and policy aspects of their profession. Such colleges therefore play an important role in the development of military officers. Officers – being the leaders within the military – formulate, plan, and guide the path of the military in achieving its aims, goals, and objectives. They act as important instruments for the propagations.
of ideas within the military and are by any standards therefore the most important instrument for change.

There are various levels of staff training for officers during their career in the military. For example, an officer may be sent to various staff courses: as a captain he may be sent to a single service command and staff school to prepare for company command and equivalent staff posts; as a major, to a single or joint service college to prepare for battalion command and equivalent staff posts; and as a colonel or brigadier to a higher Staff College to prepare for brigade and division command and equivalent postings.

Different nations have taken a wide variety of approaches to the form, curriculum and status of Staff Colleges. Some courses act as filters for promotion or entry into a specialist staff corps. The length of courses vary widely between three months and three years, with some having entrance and/or exit examinations. The more senior the course, the more likely that it will include strategic, political and joint aspects, with junior courses often focusing on single service and tactical aspects of warfare.

Military Staff Colleges are used to train military officers throughout their careers. Some of the courses they offer include:

- Junior staff courses
- Intermediate staff courses
- Senior staff courses
- Strategic and defence studies
- Special arms training

What officers are taught at these Staff Colleges determines their outlook on life throughout their military career and even beyond. Staff Colleges can therefore be used to groom these officers to respect gender diversity. This will lay the basis for how they perceive gender and get them to know the important role gender issues have to play in the modern world.

Staff Colleges prepare field grade officers to lead and command organisations, and serve as a source of leadership expertise within the military. They model critical thinking and life-long learning, preparing field grade officers to improve organisations while operating to accomplish the mission. They educate and develop leaders for full-spectrum joint, inter-agency and multinational operations; act as lead agent for the army’s leadership development programme; and advance the art and science of the profession of arms in support of army operational requirements.

Staff Colleges provide a stable beacon for the future by supporting leadership development and education. They ensure the professional vitality of the military corps of officers by preparing them to discharge their duties in the service of their nations. Today’s contemporary operating environment requires leaders for tomorrow’s joint, inter-agency and multinational operations. Staff Colleges tend to replicate the operational environment in the classroom.
Training on gender can bring many advantages to the African military. It has been proved that in modern conflicts, the expert management of delicate local politics, cultural understanding, economic development and humanitarian efforts are as important as any precision military strikes against insurgencies in urban environments. This requires a diverse taskforce with a large toolbox of skills, training and professional aptitudes. Allowing women to serve in combat roles would provide a greater variety of capabilities that enhance officer corps’ military strategies and soldiers’ professionalism.

Normally, military reform follows slowly in the wake of societal reform. The military is, after all, composed entirely of men and women from our hometowns. The state of gender discrimination in the military persists because of rampant sexism that has yet to be eradicated in African and global society. One day men and women will serve alongside each other in combat. A female infantry officer will give orders to male sergeants, who in turn direct their squads, which will be composed of both men and women. They will be a more professional military force – not because a woman commands it, but because it does not matter that she is a woman.

In order to devise feasible and appropriate solutions to security problems today, Staff Colleges are obliged to deal with complex and chaotic dilemmas in a manner acceptable to myriad participants. Consequently, they should be migrating from the traditional version of military activities to perspectives shaped by the ever-changing geopolitical mind-set. While still retaining their roots in military dogma, the undercurrents surrounding the shifting professional landscape and knowledge are similar to those that coalesced to form the curricula of most modern Staff Colleges. The curricula of Staff Colleges should now be designed to cater for new experiences and changing trends. This will supply the lens through which military officers can interpret changes not only to the military profession of arms and its staff education, but, more importantly, to their acceptance of the constantly shifting global environment.

The military is a service provider and, like all other service providers, it is necessary that the human resource be adequately provided for in terms of recruitment, training and retention. The main purpose of Staff Colleges is to provide opportunities for officers to study a wide range of courses (academic and non-academic) at tertiary level and to various degrees. To accomplish the general aim of these colleges, the curriculum must be diversified sufficiently in depth and breadth to cater for a wide range of specialists, as well as providing basic military training. Programmes that could be taken on board must address current emerging issues for the overall development of the personnel and country concerned.

Training generally involves four stages that form a training cycle: planning and preparation, implementation, evaluation and follow-up.

The training cycle points to good practice that needs to be adopted for a gender training programme. The implication is that gender training should be continuous. The results from one existing initiative feed a new training need. Training therefore becomes a significant tool to integrate gender issues into the mainstream. It must take cognisance of several other changes within the establishment that have to do with aspects like policy, reforming existing protocols to make them gender sensitive.

It is strongly recommended that policymakers integrate gender into the agenda of military training early in the planning process. This in itself poses the challenge of coping with the perceptions of some older commanders. Effort should be made to stress that gender is a social concept that refers to men and women, boys and girls. Armed forces personnel should clearly understand the operational implications of this, particularly at the international level. Staff Colleges should therefore:

- Be gender sensitive in their aims and objectives
- Include gender issues in their curricula
- Organise programmes to address all forms of gender discrimination
- Provide opportunities for experienced personnel of all sexes to be involved in the training programmes that are developed
- Organise short courses to address gender- and sex-related issues.
Lessons learned and best practice from the NATO CoC

Brig. Gen. Gerd Bischof
Director of academic planning and policy, NDC

The NATO Defence College is the premier academic institution of NATO. It was established 60 years ago by General Dwight Eisenhower and is located in Rome, Italy. This year happens to be our 60th anniversary. The mission of the NDC is to contribute to the effectiveness and cohesion of the Alliance by developing its role as a leading centre of education, study and research on transatlantic security issues. The core business of the NDC is the so-called ‘Senior Course’, which we often refer to as our ‘flagship’ course and lasts for nearly six months. Two such courses are run every year and today we have accumulated the experience of the preceding 118 courses.

At the moment we are running Course 119 and I will speak in detail about the course a little later on.

The NDC mission is to prepare selected officers and civilian officials for important NATO and NATO-related international appointments. Courses are open to both the military and civilians. Participants come from ministries of defence, ministries of foreign affairs and ministries of the interior. They come mainly from NATO countries, but also from the wider partnership that includes the Mediterranean Dialogue countries, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative countries and other partners. We call this ‘The Alliance’. The NDC is very much a ‘living organism’ and as such it adapts to the constantly changing global environment. Simply said, we educate the military and civilians together and we call this the ‘Comprehensive Approach’.

We try to encourage creative thinking about the key issues facing the Alliance and the world, and in order to achieve this, the NDC runs academic studies and research projects in support of the Alliance’s wider goals. These aims deal with the strategic or political level. The participants who attend courses at the NDC are fully educated individuals and extremely well prepared, and their time at the NDC is meant as a sort of ‘finishing school’ to refine and prepare them completely for taking up future positions at the very top political and military levels.

At the moment the NDC runs five major courses lasting from one to 22 weeks. Since it does not have an in-house teaching faculty, we search out the very best and brightest lecturers in the world and invite them to speak to our students. The reason why there is no teaching faculty is very simple and understandable: it allows us to look for the best and most experienced lecturers on specific subjects. This ‘head-hunting’ process guarantees that our students have the unique opportunity of listening to and learning from only the top people in the world. Our lecturers include professors, ambassadors, politicians and flag officers.

In addition to lectures, the NDC also runs course exercises where our students engage in role-playing based on real-life situations and emergencies. For example, one
student plays the role of the secretary general of the UN and another plays the high representative of a nation. A third can be the spokesperson for the Alliance with responsibility for addressing the media. Telling you this, you will appreciate that the NDC is working on the strategic level. Study projects and individual papers represent additional opportunities for the faculty to evaluate and grade our students. They also provide students with the chance to demonstrate what they have learned both individually and as part of a group. To complete and complement each ‘Senior Course’, we engage in three so-called field studies that last two weeks each. During these study tours we visit different nations and are briefed on national defence, interior and foreign policy by top representatives of each nation.

The mission of the NDC is not limited to running in-house courses, for we also especially reach out to external stakeholders. This is why the college’s third pillar is ‘Outreach’. With this pillar we take our experience, goodwill, knowledge and especially our philosophy, which is based on respect, loyalty, honesty, acceptance and goodwill, to the wider world. ‘Outreach’ is the face of the college.

A highlight of our academic year is the annual CoC, which is always chaired by the commandant of the NDC. It always takes place in one member country that volunteers to co-host the event with the NDC. We always begin by deciding on the main theme of the conference. Everything else follows on this first fundamental decision, which is made by the commandant of the NDC. The conference always begins with keynote speeches and additional presentations on subjects that are closely linked to the main theme of the conference. You will agree with me that the conference is a unique opportunity for fellow commandants from academic-military institutions literally from all over the world to gather under one roof.

If we turn our attention to Africa, how do NATO and the AU work together at the moment? The continued presence of NATO staff through the NATO Senior Military Liaison Office in Addis Ababa is essential to show the permanent ‘face of NATO’ within the AU. This allows NATO to improve the range of the operational support that is both requested and required by the AU. This close cooperation is undoubtedly positive for the establishment of contacts with the AU and its partners. This positive atmosphere permits further engagement by NATO and opens the door to bilateral visits and exchanges of ideas. As you see, the level we are talking about here is very high. Let me say that NATO’s cooperation with the AU is always of strategic value, must be mutually beneficial and must balance with other NATO commitments.

Returning to the NDC, participants in its courses get the chance to discuss topics of mutual interest in an atmosphere of true free and frank academic freedom. Furthermore, the conference offers everyone the chance to meet his/her peers and colleagues face to face. As you will surely appreciate, personal relations and knowledge of one another are fundamental for the success of any alliance, especially one as complex and wide reaching as NATO’s.

What does this mean on the practical level for our cooperation, be it within the CoC or more directly within the NDC? I do not want to be impolite by saying that at the moment the AU does not have an equivalent institution to the NDC. Unfortunately, this situation does not make things easier. But, as all of us here today are academics, we as flag officers have to find solutions.

It follows that at the moment one can only cooperate and talk to each other and exchange ideas, but there is no real possibility of implementing these ideas. To improve on this situation we should ensure the participation by the AU in our main conferences and events. Your participation would mean that together we could develop and discuss topics of common interest. Another possibility might be the reciprocal exchange of staff officers in common exercises run by our respective defence colleges.

In closing, an opportunity is offered for ACoC to visit the NDC in Rome and – depending on the organisation’s wishes – gain a deeper understanding of how NATO runs and organises this unique educational institution. In synthesis, the issue of closer cooperation has to be presented by the AU directly to NATO in order to start the ball rolling.
The problems that we face today are too complex for any organisation to solve by itself because individually we lack the resources and skills, and so we have to depend on others if we are to make progress. In the United Kingdom (UK) we call this an ‘integrated approach’: it is one where the key organisations work collaboratively together to address a problem that concerns us all, but which none of us can solve by ourselves. This approach means that we need to bring civilian and military organisations together to achieve effects across the security, economic, development, governance and political lines of operations, and these need to be mutually supportive.

How do you do this? The first step is to work out who the key organisations or individuals are and who has the skill or resources to make an impact on the problem. Once these organisations are identified, we try to understand them. What are their objectives? What are the freedoms and constraints that define how they work? What are they good at or weaker at? Where are they coming from and why? How best should we approach them? Then we build a relationship with them, which needs to be based on respect, not command – they are unlikely (in the UK anyway) to be under military command and so they have to want to work with us for their and our mutual benefit. Then we join with them in analysing the problem and planning a coherent response – we will both enrich each other’s processes, and unless we share a common understanding of the problem, we will never manage to work together. This is critical; otherwise, like two builders on one building site – one trying to build a house, the other a factory – they will both fail!

To do this you need people with the right skills – what we call civilian–military cooperation (CIMIC) skills. Ideally you need military people who can do this, but also civilians or pathfinders reaching out across the gulf that can separate civilians/military from both sides and meeting in the middle. But these people must be empowered by their bosses and the chain of command must recognise the importance of this role and of the necessity of an integrated approach.

In the UK this has addressed this in a number of ways: by the creation of the Stabilisation Unit (SU), which acts as CIMIC function, but also provides deployable civilian expertise and creates the Military Stabilisation Support Group (MSSG), which acts as the military bridge; i.e. it fulfils the CIMIC function, but also stand in for the civilian expertise if unable to operate.

The SU was created following lessons from Iraq, because there was a need to have UK civilian focus for stabilisation. The Civilian Stabilisation Group (CSG) is a pool of trained and deployable civilians able to operate in arduous conditions. A key element of the UK’s approach is 1,000+ people motivated, skilled, trained and
willing to assist the UK government to address instability in fragile and conflict-affected countries, in particular by enhancing the capacity of others for self-governance.

In October 2011, 165 CSGs were deployed in 19 countries, mainly in Afghanistan, but also Kosovo and Georgia (both policing missions). However, there are times when civilians can have little impact – perhaps because the situation is too dangerous, perhaps because locals won’t listen to a civilian perspective. MSSGs can then step in. They support integrated planning from the cross-governmental level downwards, provide stabilisation and CIMIC expertise from governmental level downwards, and also support contingency operations. The MSSG focus is our focus in stabilising unstable situations that are fragile, failing, failed, conflict-affected contexts; in other words we try to stabilise instability.

The MSSG address these situations through integrated civilian and military activity through a comprehensive or integrated approach. The UK military refers to the military aspects of this as Joint Action, breaking it down into ‘Fires’, ‘Influence’ and ‘Manoeuvre’. There are no hard line between them and everything has an influence. Obviously, we need to deal with a situation as we find it, by curbing its excesses and dealing with the symptoms in the order: constrain – contain – manage – counter – defeat.

This is where the MSSG focuses. We will be involved in dealing with the symptoms of instability, but the main effort should be addressing its causes. These could be affects concerning irregular actors, insurgents and a political settlement. Thus the MSSG’s business and why it exists is to:

- Help build capacity
- Help transform the reality of instability
- Address the causes of instability

We think CIMIC is a key function that is required everywhere and in every situation. There will always be non-military people and a non-military element to the situation, and we need to work with them. We act in direct support of the civilian experts deployed by the SU and act as their eyes and ears – and hands and feet – by reaching the parts that they cannot and extending their reach.

Civilians, on the other hand, work with the military commander by advising on stabilisation and delivering a civil effect where required. We conduct post-op interviews of all our staff to gather collective insights into the operation.
A safe, secure and stable Africa is in the United States’ national interest. Africans are best able to address African challenges. The end states sought is that the US, US citizens and US interests are protected from threats emanating from Africa; that African militaries contribute to the safety, security, and stability of their nations and regions; that Africa is not a safe haven for al-Qaeda or other violent extremists; and that Africans are protected from the threat of mass atrocities.

African challenges are global security issues and these include growing violent extremism in Somalia, the problematic relationship between Sudan and South Sudan, piracy, trafficking, irregular militaries, ethnic strife and instability, poor governance and corruption, and pandemic diseases like HIV/AIDS and malaria. The mission of Africa Command (AFRICOM) is to protect and defend the national security interests of the US by strengthening the defence capabilities of African states and regional organisations and, when directed, to conduct military operations in order to deter and defeat transnational threats and provide a security environment conducive to good governance and development.

In order to deter/defeat violent extremism, AFRICOM supports the concept of the ‘3-D’ US government approach – diplomacy, development and defence; supports partner counterterrorism training; addresses conditions conducive to extremist recruiting; and denies safe haven. It also promotes regional cooperation by supporting training and mentoring of African peacekeeping forces, as well as bilateral and multilateral exercises, and enhancing interoperability of tactics, techniques and communications.

In order to achieve enduring and tailored engagement, the US builds capable, sustainable forces and defence institutions that are subordinate to civilian authority; respectful of the rule of law; committed to the defence and well-being of its citizens; and balanced among the air, ground and maritime sectors, with needed enablers.

In preparing for crisis response, AFRICOM engages in cooperative security locations to support building and sustaining lines of communication, and is prepared to help protect African nations and their people, and engage in joint and combined readiness exercises.
Day Three

Discussions from the conference
Discussions from the conference

DISCUSSIONS FROM THE CONFERENCE ARE SUMMARISED IN THE FOLLOWING BINDING DECISIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. TAKING NOTE of the changing nature of security on the continent where security is placed on the individual and taking into account the increasing role of international and regional actors in understanding and responding to peace and security challenges, ACoC encourages Commandants to assume responsibility for the development of military professionals

2. FURTHER ACKNOWLEDGING the need for effective and coherent approaches in dealing with peace and security matters in a multidimensional context

3. STRESSES the increasing need for harmonised training in preparing officers, as they are required to operate in the same theatre to solve common African problems and in this regard the importance of having harmonised training syllabi among all Staff Colleges for the common understanding of military concepts and doctrine

4. ACKNOWLEDGES ongoing challenges in gaining formal recognition by continental bodies

5. REITERATES that while it is the role of armed forces to defend countries, it is the role of Command and Staff Colleges to prepare succeeding generations of officers for the military profession, cognisant of the changing security environment in a globalised world

6. FURTHER ACKNOWLEDGES that, notwithstanding financial constraints, implementation of decisions undertaken in previous conferences is an ongoing process with substantial progress having been made in terms of the agreed result areas

7. FURTHER ENDORSES the importance of the platform that ACoC provides in sharing experiences and best practice that colleges should take into consideration and model to their own unique environments

8. REITERATES the importance of inter-college communication, reminds members of available resources such as the ACoC website and encourages further exploration in the use of social media networks, like Twitter, YouTube and Facebook, which should be maximised to enhance opportunities for the organisation

9. CLARIFIES the differences between African Peace Support Trainers’ Association (APSTA) and ACoC, noting that whereas APSTA works for the alignment and harmonisation of peacekeeping training opportunities with those training institutions, ACoC focuses on the overall development of military professionals, where improved military proficiency would ultimately benefit peacekeeping and related activities

10. NOTES that the current vision and mandate of ACoC should thus not be limited to peacekeeping operations alone, but also include the overall professional development of a military officer who has all-round skills, is knowledgeable on the dynamics of the continent and the world, and is able to operate with other militaries in a multinational environment

11. NOTES that as a contribution to peace and security on the continent, and in line with the conference theme of ‘Globalisation and human rights in Africa’, that the effects of globalisation on Africa needs to be addressed through developing economies and ensuring security and liberty, and that the political, legal, and constitutional rights of equality to all citizens in a country have to be addressed
12. FURTHER recognises that globalisation is a reality, and that Africa should manage globalisation to enhance human and economic rights by uniting the continent politically, economically and culturally so that Africa can face all adverse aspects of globalisation

13. FURTHER recognises that in order to make globalisation work for Africa, Africans must have effective governments and alert the international arena to the adverse effects of globalisation on this continent

14. STRESSES the importance that African leaders and their governments must play in creating economic stability and environmental protection

15. AFFIRMS its cognisance of the fact that Africans know and can tell that the impact of globalisation on human rights is about how each individual African on the continent can maximise his/her God-given potential to live a decent and respectful life

16. RECOGNISES the impact of foreign nation’s involvement in the peace and security architecture on the continent, which may, in addition to benefits, have negative results, and stresses the importance of African participation in overcoming these challenges by ensuring economic security through integration, food and water security, and strategic national, regional and continental collaboration

17. FURTHER recognises that the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Africa continues to pose challenges to peace and security on the continent, highlighting the importance of harmonised and focused approaches to overcoming such threats and the roles that the military can play in addressing this scourge

18. FURTHER HIGHLIGHTS the institutional security transformation in East Africa and the advantages of a collective regional approach to maximise inter-state and intra-state activities in trade, commerce and security matters in order to strengthen states’ capability and bargaining power, as opposed to an individual state’s approach, and the importance of Staff Colleges in achieving peace and security in the region and on the continent

19. STRESSES the significant role that Staff Colleges can play in the promotion of gender equality to address the many factors that contribute to gender discrimination within society and the military

20. HIGHLIGHTS the possible advantages of collaboration with the NATO Defence College and U.S. Africa Command

21. NOTES the need to adapt current thinking on new and emerging global security challenges and to adjust training and development to enhance closer collaboration between military and civilian duties

22. NOTES WITH PRIDE the successful conclusion of the SADC CJAX held in Pretoria in September, resulting in continuous improvement and benefits in attaining a degree of synergy in doctrine, training and educational methodology that is now well established within the SADC region

23. NOTES the challenges in conducting ECOWAS CJAX in 2011 due to financial challenges

24. NOTES that progress has been made in the implementation of ACoC decisions but that further commitment would be required in order to concretise and consolidate these decisions

25. NOTES with pleasure and gratitude the hosting of the 6th ACoC by the Nigeria Armed Forces Command and Staff College under the theme ‘The role of African Staff Colleges in strengthening security cooperation to meet emerging security challenges’

26. NOTES with gratitude the significant attendance of the invited African countries for the 5th ACoC and extends sincere appreciation to the Botswana Defence Command and Staff College for the successful hosting of the 5th ACoC

27. FURTHER extends its deepest appreciation to the outgoing Chair and his outstanding contribution to the aspirations of ACoC

28. FURTHER extends its heartfelt best wishes to the current ACoC Chair

29. DECIDES that the following be undertaken to enhance the efficacy of ACoC:

- Avenues for promoting education, training and development at the highest strategic and political levels should be enhanced in order to contribute to the long-term goals of solving common African peace and security challenges. This will support the long-term vision of one continental Pan-African Staff College.

- Recalling decisions of the 2nd ACoC, we urge the formation of a working group to conduct assessments and explore opportunities and challenges in the harmonisation of curricula within PSO and report its findings to the Troika for consideration by the 6th ACoC.

- Members should continue to pursue avenues for popularising ACoC through (i) outreaches outside their Staff Colleges and including the media in their communication strategies; (ii) seeking and gaining recognition and acceptance with the African Union (AU) through the AU Commission as a vital partner in promoting peace and security on the continent; (iii) formulating a strategic marketing approach in gaining this recognition and acceptance with the AU; (iv) working through Staff College Commandants, who should take full responsibility for endorsing ACoC by their respective principals.
and governments; and (v) collaboration and engagement on a military level with the NATO Defence College.

- **The ACoC agenda should be tabled again to the AU Commission and in particular the African Chiefs of Defence Staff meetings, which are held biannually, and ACoC tasks the Secretariat to table this at their next meeting.**

- **Members should submit their comments and suggestions concerning the MoU/Agreement as soon as possible to the Secretariat. A working group comprising the Troika and two other member states – Ghana and Egypt – will meet in February 2012 to finalise the MoU/Agreement. Experts, such as lawyers, the NATO Defence College and APSTA, will be invited to offer technical assistance. The product will be circulated to all member colleges for final comments before submission at the next ACoC conference for final adoption.**

- **Members should commit to undertake ACoC activities as mandated in the ACoC Month Proclamation and any other proclamations, and ACoC encourages Staff Colleges to demonstrate commitment through sustained participation, engagement, documentation and the sharing of best practice on the website and through other channels of communication.**

- **Policymakers should integrate gender into the agenda of military training early in the planning process and also mainstream gender issues in the curriculum and provide opportunities for experienced personnel to train regardless of gender.**

- **Regions should seek avenues for securing funding for conducting CJAX and encourage the East African, Central African and North African regions to pursue ACoC objectives through CJAX exercises.**

- **Concrete measures have to be undertaken to address the structural, financial, technical and administrative challenges through a working group that will:**
  - **Finalise the MoU/Agreement/constitution.**
  - **Finalise the funding and fundraising strategies.**
  - **Draft a long-term strategic plan in February 2012 with the purpose of establishing a permanent Secretariat. In the interim, the Institute for Security Studies is mandated to continue as ACoC Secretariat for a period of three years. During this period, decisions undertaken during previous meetings should be fully consolidated and operationalised.**

- **The role of the Secretariat will remain that of providing secretarial duties and undertaking any other activities as directed by the Chair.**

- **Logos submitted so far should be edited, as suggested by the plenary. The logos will then be recirculated to ACoC members for consideration and endorsement. Some suggestions and comments include the removal of the stars and rifle images and the incorporation of symbols of peace, like a dove or olive branch.**

- **In funding future conferences, host colleges will continue to pay for costs related to accommodation, meals for two delegates per college, the venue for the conference and associated costs (interpreters, local transport, etc.), while the ACoC Secretariat will bear the costs of invited speakers and observers (flights and accommodation). Each college that is represented will cover its own travel costs. The total costs related to any additional participants should be covered by the particular college.**
Appendixes

Appendix A
Programme

Appendix B
List of participants
## Appendix A

### Programme

**THEME: GLOBALISATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA**

Sunday 27 November – Thursday 1 December 2011
Gaborone, Botswana

#### SUNDAY, 27 NOVEMBER

**Arrivals - Botswana Defence Command and Staff College (BDCSC)**

#### MONDAY 28, NOVEMBER

**Session I: Official opening of the 5th ACoC**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>RESPONSIBILITY</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>08:00–09:00</td>
<td>Registration</td>
<td>BDCSC/ACoC Secretariat</td>
<td>Service dress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09:00–09:30</td>
<td>Welcome and introduction of delegates</td>
<td>BDCSC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09:30–10:00</td>
<td>Opening ceremony by guest of honour</td>
<td>BDCSC</td>
<td>BDCSC to confirm speaker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:00–10:15</td>
<td>Group photo</td>
<td>BDCSC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:15–10:35</td>
<td>TEA/COFFEE BREAK</td>
<td>HOTEL</td>
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**Session II: Review of the 4th ACoC and implications for ACoC’s future**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>RESPONSIBILITY</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10:35–11:05</td>
<td>Chairperson’s report</td>
<td>4th ACoC Chair</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:05–11:30</td>
<td>Plenary discussions (Chair’s report)</td>
<td>Staff Colleges</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:30–12:30</td>
<td>Issues of MoU, logo, funding and other matters</td>
<td>ACoC Secretariat/4th ACoC Chair</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:30–13:30</td>
<td>LUNCH BREAK</td>
<td>HOTEL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:30–14:00</td>
<td>Plenary discussions (issues of MoU, logo, funding etc.)</td>
<td>BDCSC/ACoC Secretariat</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14:00–15:00</td>
<td>CJ AX feedback</td>
<td>SANWC and GAFCSC</td>
<td>Session includes questions/comments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:00–15:20</td>
<td>TEA/COFFEE BREAK</td>
<td>HOTEL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:20–16:30</td>
<td>Presentations by Staff Colleges on ACoC Month activities</td>
<td>Staff Colleges with feedback</td>
<td>Session includes questions/comments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16:30</td>
<td>Summing up and end of Day One</td>
<td>BDCSC/ACoC Secretariat</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18:30</td>
<td>Departure from hotel to Sir Seretse Khama Barracks for cocktails</td>
<td>BDCSC</td>
<td>BDCSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19:00</td>
<td>Cocktails and handover ceremony</td>
<td>BDCSC</td>
<td>BDCSC to confirm</td>
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## DAY TWO
**TUESDAY, 29 NOVEMBER**

### Session III: Setting the scene for the 5th ACoC

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>RESPONSIBILITY</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>08:30–08:50</td>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>BDCSC</td>
<td>Service dress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08:50–09:30</td>
<td>Keynote address</td>
<td>Prof. David Abdulai CEO/Executive Director UNISA School of Business Leadership</td>
<td>Session includes questions/comments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09:30–09:50</td>
<td>TEA/COFFEE BREAK</td>
<td>HOTEL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09:50–11:00</td>
<td>Presentation by colleges of their papers on ‘Globalisation and human rights’ and implications for ACoC</td>
<td>Papers from Staff Colleges (Ghana, Egypt)</td>
<td>(20 min. each for each presentation) Session includes discussions</td>
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### Session IV: Lessons learned and implications for ACoC

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11:00–11:30</td>
<td>Globalisation and human rights in Africa: the role of Staff Colleges in promoting gender and Equal Opportunity, Sierra Leone Army</td>
<td>Brig Kestoria O. Kabia Ass. Chief of Defence Staff - Gender and Equal Opportunity, Sierra Leone Army</td>
<td>Session includes questions/comments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:30–12:00</td>
<td>Lessons learned and best practice from the NATO CoC</td>
<td>Brig. Gerd Bischof Director, Academic Planning and Policy Division NATO Defence College</td>
<td>Session includes questions/comments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:00–13:30</td>
<td>LUNCH</td>
<td>HOTEL</td>
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<tr>
<td>13:30–14:00</td>
<td>Stabilisation: a comprehensive approach</td>
<td>Speaker TBC</td>
<td>Session includes questions/comments</td>
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<tr>
<td>14:00–14:30</td>
<td>Peace and security in Africa</td>
<td>U.S. Command and General Staff College/ AFRICOM</td>
<td>Session includes questions/comments</td>
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<tr>
<td>14:30–15:00</td>
<td>Plenary discussions</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>15:00–15:20</td>
<td>TEA/COFFEE BREAK</td>
<td>HOTEL</td>
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### Session V: Consideration of the strategic direction of 5th ACoC

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<tr>
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<th>RESPONSIBILITY</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15:20–15:50</td>
<td>Views on the future of ACoC</td>
<td>5th ACoC Chair</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:50–16:00</td>
<td>Choosing the theme for the 6th ACoC</td>
<td>BDCSC/Nigeria Armed Forces Command and Staff College</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16:00–16:30</td>
<td>Conclusions and end of Day Two</td>
<td>BDCSC/ACoC Secretariat</td>
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<tr>
<td>16:30</td>
<td>Own time</td>
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### DAY THREE
**WEDNESDAY, 30 NOVEMBER**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>RESPONSIBILITY</th>
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<tr>
<td>08:30–08:50</td>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>BDCSC</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>08:50–10:00</td>
<td>Presentation of 5th ACoC decisions &amp; recommendations</td>
<td>All Staff Colleges/ACoC Secretariat</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>10:00–10:20</td>
<td>TEA/COFFEE BREAK</td>
<td>HOTEL</td>
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### Session VI: Closing of the 5th ACoC

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<th>ITEM</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10:20–11:20</td>
<td>Signing of 5th ACoC decisions &amp; recommendations</td>
<td>All Staff Colleges/ACoC Secretariat</td>
<td>Service dress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:20–12:00</td>
<td>Official closing of the 5th ACoC</td>
<td>BDCSC</td>
<td>Service dress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:00–13:00</td>
<td>Exchange of official gifts</td>
<td>5th ACoC Chair</td>
<td>Service dress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:00–14:00</td>
<td>LUNCH</td>
<td>HOTEL</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>14:00–15:00</td>
<td>Tour of SADC headquarters (Secretariat and Planning Element)</td>
<td>BDCSC</td>
<td>Casual dress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:00–16:00</td>
<td>Social activities</td>
<td>BDCSC</td>
<td>Casual dress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19:00–23:00</td>
<td>Official dinner at conference venue</td>
<td>BDCSC</td>
<td>Casual dress</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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### THURSDAY, 1 DECEMBER

**Departures - BDCSC**
# Appendix B

## List of participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>CONTACT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAME</td>
<td>POSITION</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maj Gen Jackson N Waweru</td>
<td>Commandant Defense Staff College (DSC) Kenya</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col Loonena Naisho</td>
<td>Head of Writing Team Defense Staff College, (DSC) Kenya</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Brigadier General Ali Attefe</td>
<td>Commandant Staff College Libya</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Col Ismail Mahluf Algamati</td>
<td>Instructor Staff College Libya</td>
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<tr>
<td>Col Hamad Aboud</td>
<td>Instructor Staff College Libya</td>
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<tr>
<td>Col Nuri Ahmed Amgder</td>
<td>Instructor Staff College Libya</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brig Rick RK Chimowa</td>
<td>Commandant Staff College Libya</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Brig Gen Frederick Silzungila</td>
<td>Commandant Military School Namibia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt Col Jason Malima</td>
<td>Team Leader Defence Force Namibia</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Rear Admiral Gabriel Edmund Okoi</td>
<td>Dep. Commandant Armed Forces Command and Staff College (AFCSC) Nigeria</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Cdr Ebiobowi Abraham Zipele</td>
<td>ACoC Desk Officer Armed Forces Command and Staff College (AFCSC) Nigeria</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Lt Col Babatunde Ibrahim Alaya</td>
<td>ACoC Desk Officer Armed Forces Command and Staff College (AFCSC) Nigeria</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wing Cdr Olayinka Olusola Oyesola</td>
<td>DS/Desk Officer Armed Forces Command and Staff College (AFCSC) Nigeria</td>
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<tr>
<td>Flight Lt Haruna Shanono Ibrahim</td>
<td>Desk Officer Armed Forces Command and Staff College (AFCSC) Nigeria</td>
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<tr>
<td>R Adm P.T. Duze</td>
<td>Commandant National War College, (SANWC) South Africa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col Sean Stratford</td>
<td>Chief Instructor National War College, (SANWC) South Africa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAME</td>
<td>POSITION</td>
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<td>SO1 SANWC BPSTSA</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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This publication was made possible by the British Peace Support Team South Africa (BPSTSA). In addition, general Institute funding is provided by the governments of Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden.